UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

9-15-2011

Idaho Transportation Board v. HI Boise
Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38344

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Idaho Transportation Board v. HI Boise Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38344" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3121.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3121

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Docket No. 38344-2010

v.
HI BOISE, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company,

Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
County of Ada, Case No. CV OC 2009-03179
Honorable Ronald J. Wilper, District Judge, presiding

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB No. 1687
Thomas J. Lloyd III, ISB No. 7772
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
HI Boise, LLC

Mary V. York, ISB No. 5020
Steven C. Bowman, ISB No. 4404
Special Deputy Attorneys General
HOLLAND & HART LLP
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 2527
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527
Telephone: (208) 342-5000
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
State ofIdaho, Idaho Transportation Board

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 9

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL ....................................................................................................... 11

III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 12
A.

The Project. ............................................................................................................ 12

B.

The HI Boise Property........................................................................................... 13

C.

HI Boise's Claims For Damages Based On Access ............................................... l4
1.

The Claim as Framed by HI Boise Before the District Court .................... 14

2.

The District Court Ruling .......................................................................... 15

3.

The Access Claim as Framed by HI Boise on Appeal.. ............................. 15

4.

HI Boise's Claim for Damages is Based on Changes in Traffic
Volume, Pattern, or Flow ........................................................................... 16

5.

No Causal Connection Exists Between Movement of the Driveway
and HI Boise's Claim for Damages Based on Changes in the Pattern
of Traffic Flow ........................................................................................... 16

6.

The Driveway on Vista Has Not Been Closed or Restricted ..................... 16

7.

The Alleged Changes in Traffic Conditions on Vista Avenue Were
Conditions that Existed Before the Project or Were Not Caused by
the Project. ................................................................................................. 17

8.

No "Permanent Ramp" Was Constructed on HI Boise's Property............ 17

9.

Emergency Vehic1es Can Readily Access the HI Boise Property............ .18

D.

ITD Has Not Condemned An Access Right Reserved By Deed ........................... 18

E.

No Structure Alleged To Block Visibility Of HI Boise's Property Is
Located On Property Condemned From HI Boise................................................. 20

IV.

THRESHOLD LEGAL STANDARDS ............................................................................ .20

V.

SUMMARY OF GROUNDS FOR AFFIRMING DISMISSAL OF HI BOISE'S
ACCESS CLAIM ............................................................................................................... 21

VI.

ARGUMENT ON ACCESS CLAIMS .............................................................................. 22
A.

ITD Has Not Taken Or Closed HI Boise's Access On Vista Avenue ................... 22

B.

Idaho Law Bars Claims For Damages In Condemnation Cases Based On
Changes In Traffic Flow, Volumes, and Patterns .................................................. 23

lTD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL-2

C.

1.

Idaho Case Law Bars Claims for Damages Based on Traffic ................... 23

2.

The Majority of States Bar Claims for Damages in Condemnation
Cases Based on Traffic Flows, Patterns, or Routes ................................... 24

The District Court Applied The Correct Legal Standard To HI Boise's
Access Claim ......................................................................................................... 24
1.

Introduction................................................................................................ 24

2.

The District Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard ........................... .25

3.

The Rule of Law Denying Damages Based on Changes in the
Pattern of Traffic Flow Applies in All Condemnation Cases Where
the Claim is Made ...................................................................................... 25

4.

Bastian has Ample Support in the Law .................................................... .27

5.

Fonburg Does Not Support HI Boise's Contention that, in a
Condemnation Case Involving a Physical Taking, Any and All
Possible Forms of Damage Are Compensable .......................................... .27

D.

The Alleged Changes In Traffic Conditions Cited By HI Boise Were Not
Caused By Movement Of HI Boise's Driveway.................................................... 30

E.

An Increase In Traffic Is Not A Taking And Is Not Compensable...................... .30

F.

A Change In The Degree Of Difficulty Of Left-Hand Turning Movements
Is Not A Taking Of Property Or A Property Right And Is Not
Compensable .......................................................................................................... 31

G.

Idaho Law Bars Claims For Damages Caused By Changes Or Construction
On Property Not Condemned From HI Boise ........................................................ 31

H.

Idaho Law Defining "Severance Damages" Bars Damage Claims That Are
Not Caused By The Use Of The Condemned Property......................................... 33

I.

lTD Has Not Condemned An Access Right Reserved By Deed........................... 33
1.

The Access Right Reserved by Deed Has Not Been Taken ...................... 33

2.

The District Court Decision Cited by HI Boise Does Not Support Its
Claim of Taking of an Access Right in this Case...................................... 34

3.

Under HI Boise's Reasoning, the Right of Access Reserved by
Deed was Condemned and Extinguished by No Later than 1972 ............. 36

J.

Even IfITD Had Closed HI Boise's Driveway On Vista Avenue, It Would
Not Be A Taking .................................................................................................... 38

K.

HI Boise's Claim For Inverse Condemnation Of Access Also Fails On The
Facts ....................................................................................................................... 39
1.

Movement of the Driveway Approach on Vista Avenue Did Not
Change Traffic Conditions on Vista Avenue ............................................. 39

lTD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 3

2.

Emergency Vehicles Have No Difficulty Accessing the HI Boise
Property Using the Vista Avenue Driveway.............................................. 39

3.

HI Boise's Driveway is Four Feet Wider than Standard Commercial
Driveways in Ada County. Therefore, if HI Boise's Claims Were
True, No Emergency Vehicles or Commercial Truck Traffic Could
Access any Commercial Property in Boise................................................ 39

VII.

SUMMARY OF GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL OF VISIBILITY CLAIMS ............... .40

VIII.

ARGUMENT ON VISIBILITY CLAIM ......................................................................... .41
1.

Introduction ............................................................................................................ 41

2.

Because HI Boise has No Right to a Particular Pattern of Traffic Flow, it
Necessarily has No Right to Compensation Based on Loss of Visibility of
its Property by Passing Traffic .............................................................................. .41

3.

States Have Uniformly Denied Claims for Loss of Visibility When the
Structures Complained of are Not Built on the Condemned Property.................. .4J

4.

No Split in Authority Exists When None of the Structures Blocking
Visibility are Built on the Condemned Land ......................................................... 50

5.

None of the Cases Cited by HI Boise Support its Claim ....................................... 50

6.

Contrary To HI Boise's Argument, lTD is Not Improperly Segmenting the
Project. ................................................................................................................... 57

7.

lTD Did Not Admit that HI Boise has Suffered Loss of Visibility....................... 57

8.

HI Boise Mischaracterizes the Visibility ofthe Property After the Project. ......... 57

9.

Idaho Code § 7-711(2)(b) Does Not Permit Recovery of Damages Based on
Project Improvements Built Beyond or Outside the Condemned Property........... 58

10.

HI Boise Cannot Establish a Taking or Recover Compensation for Loss of
Visibility Caused by Construction on Property Not Condemned from HI
Boise...................................................................................................................... 59

lTD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
FEDERAL CASES

Campbell v. Us.,
266 U.S. 368 (1924) ........................................................................................................... 32, 33
Klaber v. Lakenan,
64 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1933) ................................................................................................. 50, 53
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg 'I Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) ..................................................................................... .25
STATE CASES

224 Troup Realty, Inc. v. State,
88 A.D.2d 773, 451 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y.App.Div. 1982) ....................................................... .49
8,960 Square Feet v. Alaska,
806 P.2d 843 (Alaska 1991) ..................................................................................................... 52
Acme Theatres, Inc. v. New York,
310 N.Y.S.2d 496,258 N.E.2d 912 (1970) ............................................................................. .52
Adams v. Dept. ofHigh ways ofState ofMont. ,
753 P.2d 846 (Mont. 1988) ...................................................................................................... 30
Brown v. City of Twin Falls,
124 Idaho 39, 855 P.2d 876 (1993) .................................................................................. passim
C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Hwy. Dist. No.4,
139 Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003) .................................. :....................................................... 33
City ofBerkeley v. von Adelung,
214 Cal. App. 2d 791,29 Cal. Rptr. 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) ................................................ 31
City ofJacksonville v. Twin Restaurants, Inc.,
953 So. 2d 720 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) ............................................................................... 27
City of Wichita v. McDonald's Corp.,
971 P.2d 1189 (Kan. 1999) .......................................................................................... 45, 46, 47
Com., Dept. ofHwys. v. Deloteus,
444 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) ...................................................................................... 31
County ofBexar v. Santikos,
144 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. 2004) ........................................................................................ 50, 55, 56

lTD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 5

Covington v. Jefferson County,
137 Idaho 777, 53 P.3d 828 (2002) ........................................................................ 20, 24, 25,31
Dept. of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp.,
198 P.3d 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) ...................................................................................... .43
Dept. of Transp. v. Fisher,
958 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) ............................................................................... 30
Dept. of Transp. v. Marilyn Hickey Ministries,
159 P.3d 111 (Colo. 2007) .......................................................................................... .42, 44, 45
Division ofAdministration, State Dept. of Transp. v. Capital Plaza, Inc.,
397 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1981 ) ....................................................................................................... 27
Grossman Investments v. State by Humphrey,
571 N.W.2d 47 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) ................................................................................... .48
Hughes v. State ofIdaho,
80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 (1958) .......................................................................................... 38
In re Appropriation ofEasement for Highway Purposes (Preston v. Weiler),
194 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962) .................................................................................... .49
Intermountain Sports, Inc. v. Utah Dept. ofTransp.,
103 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) ........................................................................................ .43
Ivers v. Utah Dept. ofTransp.,
154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007) ..................................................................................... .42, 43,50,53
James v. State,
88 Idaho 172,397 P.2d 766 (1964) ................................................................................... .25, 41
Killinger v. Twin Falls Hwy. Dist.,
135 Idaho 322, 17 P.3d 266 (2000) ......................................................................................... .20
KMST, LLC v. County ofAda,
138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003) ............................................................................................ 20
Mabe v. State,
83 Idaho 222,360 P.2d 799 (1961) .......................................................................................... 25
McCuskey v. Canyon Cty. Com'rs,
128 Idaho 213, 912 P.2d 100 (1996) ........................................................................................ 37
Merritt v. State,
113 Idaho 142,742 P.2d 397 (1987) ................................................................................ passim
National Biscuit Co. v. New York,
211 N.Y.S.2d 435 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) .............................................................................. .49
lTD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 6

Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell,
34 Idaho 601, 202 P. 1065 (1921) ..................................................................................... .31, 32
People v. Wasserman,
50 Cal. Rptr. 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) .......................................................................... 50, 54, 55
Powell v. McKelvey,
56 Idaho 291, 53 P.2d 626 (1935) ............................................................................... .23, 26, 41
Rueth v. State,
100 Idaho 203,596 P.2d 75 (1978) .......................................................................................... 22
State, Dept. of Transp. v. Suit City ofAventura,
774 So. 2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) .................................................................................. .48
State ex. ref. Missouri Hwy. & Transp. Com 'n v. Dooley,
738 S.W.2d 457 (Mo. App. 1987) .................................................................................... .42, 48
State ex rei. Moore v. Bastian,
97 Idaho 444,546 P.2d 399 (1976) .................................................................................. passim
State ex ref. Rich v. Fonburg,
80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958) .................................................................................... passim
State Hwy. Com 'n v. Lavasek,
385 P.2d 361 (New Mexico 1963) ........................................................................................... 49
State Road Dept. v. Lewis,
170 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1964) ....................................................................................................... 58
State v. Bradley B., LLC, and Dillon Limited Partnership, et al., Fourth District Court
Case No. CV OC 08185194 ................................................................................... 19, 20, 34, 35
State v. Ensley,
164 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 1960) ..................................................................................................... 27
State v. Kimco ofEvansville, Inc.,
902 N.E.2d 206 (Ind. 2009) ..................................................................................................... 27
State v. McCarley,
247 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) ............................................................................... 50, 56
State v. Munday Enterprises,
868 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1994) ............................................................................................. .48, 56
State v. Priesmeyer,
867 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) .............................................................................. .48, 56
State v. Schmidt,
805 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App. 1991), rev'd 867 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1993) ...................... .42, 47,51
lTD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 7

State v. Schmidt,
867 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1993) ............................................................................................. .48, 56
State v. Weiswasser,
693 A.2d 864 (N.J. 1997) ............................................................................................. 50, 51, 52
Troiano v. Colo. Dept. ofHwys.,
463 P.2d 448 (Colo. 1969) ...................................................................................................... .44
Village of Sandpoint v. Doyle,
14 Idaho 749, 95 P. 945 (1908) ................................................................................................ 38
Villages of Eden & Hazelton v. Idaho Bd. ofHwy. Dirs.,
83 Idaho 554, 367 P.2d 294 (1961) ......................................................................................... .41
Weaver v. Village ofBancroft,
92 Idaho 189,439 P.2d 697 (1968) ......................................................................................... .38
STATE STATUTES

Idaho Code § 5-224 ........................................................................................................................ 37
Idaho Code § 7-711(1)(a) ...............................................................................................................32
Idaho Code § 7-711(2)(b) .................................................................................................. 14, 32, 58
K.S.A. 26-513(d) ............................................................................................................................ 48
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Idaho Const. art. 1, § 14 ................................................................................................................. 31
OTHER AUTHORITIES

II NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.07[2][b] (3d. ed. 2006) ..................................................... .35
4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 13.21[1] (rev.3d ed. 1998) .................................................... 50
4A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 14A.03[4] (Sackman & Van Brunt eds., 3d ed. rev.
1997) ........................................................................................................................................ 51

lTD'S BIUEF ON APPEAL - 8

Respondent State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") hereby files its brief in
the appeal of this matter.
I.

INTRODUCTION

lTD filed this condemnation case to acquire a strip of land from Defendant!Appellant
HI Boise, LLC ("HI Boise"). The strip ofland is 7 feet wide and 133 feet long, totaling
approximately 960 square feet. The strip runs along the western edge of the HI Boise property
bordering Vista Avenue. ITD built a new sidewalk on the condemned property.
The total property owned by HI Boise is 9.150 acres or 398,574 square feet. Thus the
acquisition is 0.24% of the HI Boise property (less than one quarter of 1%). An MAl-certified
real estate appraiser determined the fair market value of the property-taken and the impacts on the
remaining HI Boise property to be $38,177. HI Boise Ex. 00011. However, HI Boise has sought
to recover $7.5 million in a counterclaim for inverse condemnation.
In its inverse condemnation claim, HI Boise alleges that ITD has condemned a right of
access. Specifically, HI Boise contends that a slight movement of its driveway "approach" on
Vista Avenue (the point where the private driveway meets the public right-of-way) by 2.055 feet
south and 4.480 feet east constitutes a taking of the right of access. However, HI Boise does not
seek damages caused by the movement of the approach. Rather, HI Boise seeks damages caused
by alleged changes in traffic conditions and the pattern of traffic flow on Vista Avenue and other
public roads and intersections. It contends that these changes in traffic conditions and traffic flow
make left-hand turns into and out of its property more difficult. Thus, HI Boise seeks to recover
damages for "increased circuity oftravel," even though the only change in the driveway is the
slight movement of the approach.
The undisputed facts show that no right of access has been taken or restricted in this case.
It is also undisputed that no traffic control measures were installed that prohibit left hand turns in

or out of the HI Boise driveway on Vista Avenue. In addition, a slight movement of a driveway
approach is not a taking of a "right of access." The undisputed facts also show that the movement
of the approach to the driveway did not cause changes in traffic conditions on Vista Avenue and
lTD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 9

did not result in a more circuitous route to and from the HI Boise property. The district court
held that damages based on changes in traffic conditions and pattern of traffic flow are not
compensable and dismissed HI Boise's claim for such damages.
In this appeal, HI Boise seeks a ruling that it may recover damages caused by traffic
having to take a "more circuitous route" to reach its property because the approach of its driveway
has been moved 2.055 feet south and 4.480 feet east. This claim fails as a matter oflaw for a host
of reasons, including (i) no right of access has been taken or restricted in any way; (ii) the Idaho
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a property owner does not have a protected right in the
way traffic moves on adjacent roadways, a particular pattern of traffic flow, or the ability to
access a road from both directions; (iii) the alleged changes in traffic conditions cited by HI Boise
existed before construction ofthe ITD project; (iv) the slight movement of the driveway approach
did not cause changes in traffic conditions on public roads and intersections; and (v) Idaho law
bars recovery of damages that are alleged to result from changes and construction on lands other
than the condemned property such as, in this case, Vista Avenue and other public roads and
intersections.
In an attempt to avoid decisions by the Court that specifically bar HI Boise's damage
claim, HI Boise relies on dicta from State ex rei. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60
(1958), stating that "all inconveniences" suffered in a partial taking case are compensable.
However, in the actual holdings in Fonburg, the Court ruled that most of the forms of damages
sought by the property owner in that case were not compensable. As in Fonburg, HI Boise is not
permitted to recover damages barred by law or damages that are not caused by the taking of a
compensable property right.
HI Boise's counterclaim is also based on an alleged "loss of visibility" of its property from
passing motorists. Visibility of property by passing motorists is not a recognized property right in
Idaho. The only public improvement constructed on the HI Boise property is a sidewalk, which
does not block visibility. The structures alleged to block visibility were all constructed on
existing ITD right-of-way and are not on the strip ofland condemned from HI Boise. Idaho law
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precludes recovery of damages alleged to arise from changes or construction on land other than
the condemned property. The visibility claim is also barred by the decisions of this Court holding
that a property owner does not have a property right to a particular pattern or flow oftraffic. If a
landowner does not have a property right to a particular pattern or flow of traffic, it necessarily
follows that it does not have a property right to be seen by a particular pattern or flow of traffic.
HI Boise contends that a "split in authority" exists as to the recovery of severance
damages based on loss of visibility. This is not correct. Nearly all courts bar all claims based
on loss of visibility, and all courts uniformly bar all claims for loss of visibility when the
structures alleged to block visibility are not on property condemned from the property owner.
Consequently, while HI Boise alleges a split in authority,none of the cases cited by HI Boise
actually supports its claim.
At its core, this case involves an attempt by a property owner to tum a minor
condemnation into a very large and unjustified windfall at public expense. The case threatens the
ability of ITD and other condemning authorities to build public roads and highways in Idaho.
The district court properly dismissed HI Boise's claims on summary judgment, and the decision
should be affirmed.

II.
1.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Whether a property owner can recover severance damages in a condemnation case

for the taking of access where no access has been taken.
2.

Whether a property owner can recover severance damages based on alleged

changes in traffic conditions on an adjacent roadway, particularly where the conditions existed
before the project and were not caused by the project.
3.

Whether HI Boise's claim for the alleged taking of a right of access reserved by

deed in 1967 fails as a matter of law under the undisputed facts of the case. It is undisputed that
the right of access reserved in the deeds has not been condemned. HI Boise continues to have a
full-movement driveway in the location defined in the deeds. It is undisputed that HI Boise never
obtained a permit for the access right. Therefore, the access right was never perfected and
lTD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL -11

HI Boise had nothing under the deeds for lTD to condemn. It is undisputed that the HI Boise
driveway on Vista Avenue has been moved on prior occasions during other road improvement
projects. If moving the driveway constitutes a taking of the right of access, as argued by
HI Boise, then the access right was taken and condemned long before this case.
4.

Whether a property owner may recover damages for loss of visibility by passing

motorists where Idaho law bars compensation based on an alleged right to a particular pattern or
flow of traffic.
5.

Whether a property owner may recover damages for loss of visibility where

nothing is constructed on the condemned property that blocks visibility, and all structures alleged
to block visibility are constructed entirely on existing public right-of-way.

III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Project.

For a complete description and explanation of the ITD project in this case, see Aff. of
Jason Brinkman (senior project engineer for lTD responsible for the project) (R000367-000373),
and Aff. of Robert Jacobs (Chief Transportation Engineer for Stanley Consultants, the
engineering firm that designed the project) (R000393-000400). The citations to the record in this
Statement ofthe Case are to these and other affidavits from these engineers.
This case involves a project by ITD known as the "Interstate 84Nista Interchange
Project," ITD Project No. A009(818) ("the Project"). R000368-000369, ~ 5. The Project
involves replacing the existing Vista Interchange on Interstate 84 near the Boise airport. The
existing Vista Interchange was constructed in 1969 and is no longer able to meet traffic demands
in the area. The new interchange will provide improved traffic flow with a single traffic light at
the center of the interchange that controls north-south traffic and converging on- and off-ramp
traffic via protected left hand turns in each direction. The Project also adds lanes to Interstate 84,
widens and lengthens the on- and off-ramps to and from the Interstate, and widens and improves
Vista Avenue at the approach to the new overpass. R000369,
was completed in the fall of 20 1O.
lTD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 12

~

8; R00039S,

'r~

9, 11. The Project

The projected construction cost for the entire Project is $30 million. R000369,
R000395,

~

~

9;

10. This includes demolition of the former freeway interchange, construction ofa

new interchange, construction of new on- and off-ramps, and the construction of additional lanes
on Interstate 84. By comparison, HI Boise seeks to recover $7.5 million, or 25% of the total cost
of this Project, for the condemnation of960 square feet of land.
B.

The HI Boise Property.

The HI Boise property is located on Vista Avenue near the northeast comer of the
Interstate 84 interchange. HI Boise owns and operates a Holiday Inn on the property. R000370,
~

10; R000396,

~

13. ITD condemned a narrow strip ofland along the western edge of HI Boise's

property bordering Vista Avenue. lTD acquired this strip of land in order to construct a new
sidewalk. R0003 70, ~ 11. The strip ofland is approximately 7 feet wide and 133 feet long, and
totals approximately 960 square feet

(~0.022

acres). Id. and R000397,

~~

19-20. The total land

area owned by HI Boise is 9.150 acres or 398,574 square feet. R000249. Thus, the land acquired
is 0.24% of HI Boise's property (less than one quarter of 1%).
In the "before" condition, prior to the condemnation, HI Boise had a single, fullmovement driveway on Vista Avenue on the western side of its property, and two, full-movement
driveways on Sunrise Rim Road on the northern edge of its property. A full-movement driveway
allows unrestricted right and left turns into and out of the property. None of these driveways have
been closed or restricted by the Project. See R000372-000373,
20-25; R000399-000400 ~~ 30-31; R000838-000839,

~~

~~

16-21; R000397-000398, ~~ 19,

8-15; R000951,

~

6.

Part of the Project involved widening a short section of Vista Avenue by 14 feet near the
new freeway interchange. Each side of this short section of Vista was widened by 7 feet. Some
of the widening was accomplished using existing public right-of-way. Therefore, the Project
moved the approach of HI Boise's driveway (the point where the driveway meets Vista) by a total
of2.055 feet south and 4.480 feet east. R000839,

~

17. Other than the slight movement of the

intersection point between the driveway and Vista, the rest of HI Boise's driveway remained in
the same location.
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HI Boise has landscaping walls that border each side of its driveway. ROO 1821. The
walls were not moved by the Project and the width of the driveway between the walls was not
changed. !d. Thus, the width of the driveway between the back of the sidewalk and the HI Boise
parking area is the same width as before the Project, refuting claims by HI Boise that the
driveway is now too narrow as a result of the Project. Id.
In addition, the "approach" of the Vista A venue driveway (the point where the driveway
meets the public right-of-way on Vista) is still centered at Station 24+82, as it was before the
Project. R000963. The new approach has also been constructed in line with, and entirely within

the bounds of the existing driveway onto Vista A venue before the Project. Id.
HI Boise stated in an affidavit in this case that it has obtained permission from the Ada
County Highway District ("ACHD") to install a third full-movement access on Sunrise Rim
Road. R000596,

~

16. Thus, in the "after" condition, HI Boise will havefour driveways onto the

public road system: one on Vista Avenue and three on Sunrise Rim Road. All four driveways are

full-movement driveways. None are limited to right-in, right-out turning movements. No cases
decided by this Court support a claim for "taking" of access under these conditions - under any
legal principle or analysis.
C.

HI Boise's Claims For Damages Based On Access.
1.

The Claim as Framed by HI Boise Before the District Court.

On June 15, 2009, HI Boise submitted a claim for business damages under Idaho Code
§ 7-711(2)(b) in the amount of$7.5 million. On November 4,2009, HI Boise submitted a
"supplemental" business damage claim. In these claims, HI Boise sought severance damages
based on an alleged restriction or prohibition of left-hand turns into and out of the Vista Avenue
driveway. Supp. Claim, at page 1-8 (Figure 1-5), Vista Avenue Entrance (Ex. C to Brinkman
Aff.) (filed under seal).
HI Boise brought this claim on the mistaken belief that a raised center median would be
constructed on Vista Avenue across from the HI Boise property. It is undisputed that no center
median has been constructed. Therefore, HI Boise has dropped that claim. See HI Boise Brf.
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Opp. Mot. Sum. Jmt., at R000567 et seq. (no claim or argument that a center lane median
has been constructed). After dropping that claim, HI Boise argued that such things as lane
alignments, pavement markings, and/or traffic signs would prohibit left-hand turns to and from
the driveway on Vista A venue. It is undisputed that no lane alignments, pavement markings, or
signs have been installed that prohibit left-hand turns to and from the Vista A venue driveway, and
HI Boise has dropped those claims also. See HI Boise App. Brf., at 27-43 (no claim or argument
that lane alignments, pavement markings, or traffic signs prohibit left hand turns).
Finally, HI Boise resorted to a claim for condemnation of a "right of access" based on the
slight movement ofthe driveway approach on Vista A venue. Under that claim, HI Boise has
sought damages based on what it calls a "de facto" median caused by traffic on Vista A venue.
R000582 ("the combined effects ofthe Project do result in a de facto median that contributes to
the substantial limitation of access at its primary driveway, on Vista Avenue.").

2.

The District Court Ruling.

As stated by the district court, "HI Boise contends that it is entitled to compensation for
reduction in access because there was a physical taking of property and the combined effects of
the construction project resulted in a 'de facto median' destroying access to HI Boise." Order of
July 23,2010, at R001203. The district court dismissed HI Boise's claim for damages based on
changes in traffic conditions that are alleged to make left-hand turns into and out of its driveway
on Vista A venue more difficult. Jd. at R001205. The court held:
Based on Bastian, HI Boise's argument that the traffic flow on Vista which may
make it difficult to tum left into or out of HI Boise is a compensable taking fails.
The Court finds that HI Boise has reasonable access on Vista Avenue and on
Sunrise Rim Road. Plaintiffs motion to dismiss Defendant's claim for damages
resulting from limitation of access from Vista Avenue due to alleged changes in
access flow is GRANTED.
Jd. HI Boise has appealed the decision of the district court.

3.

The Access Claim as Framed by HI Boise on Appeal.

In general, HI Boise has not appealed the ruling that it cannot recover damages based on a
non-physical taking of access in the form of a "de facto median" or changes in traffic flow.
Rather, HI Boise argues on appeal that the physical movement of its driveway 2.055 feet south
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and 4.480 feet east pennits it to recover these same damages. As stated in its brief on appeal,
HI Boise seeks to recover damages for "circuity of travel," "circuitous route," and "increased
circuity of travel." HI Boise App. Brf., at 24,33, and 36. These damages are alleged to be caused
by changes in the pattern oftraffic flow on Vista A venue.
4.

HI Boise's Claim for Damages is Based on Changes in Traffic Volume,
Pattern, or Flow.

In briefing and affidavits before the district court, HI Boise based its access-related
damage claims on changes in traffic flow and pattern. See, e.g., R000582 ("the combined effects
ofthe Project do result in a de facto median that contributes to the substantial limitation of access
at its primary driveway, on Vista Avenue."); R000578 ("Northbound traffic on Vista A venue
turning left onto Elder Street will exceed the capacity ofthe traffic control devices in place and
the planned tum lanes, meaning that traffic will back up at the VistalElder intersection beyond
HI Boise's access approach on Vista Avenue."); R000670, at ~~ 33,37 (traffic stacking at Elder
Street stoplight will interfere with access at the Vista A venue driveway).
5.

No Causal Connection Exists Between Movement of the Driveway and HI
Boise's Claim for Damages Based on Changes in the Pattern of Traffic Flow.

Before the district court and now on appeal, HI Boise has not made any attempt to
establish a causal connection between the movement ofthe driveway and its claim that it will
suffer damages due to traffic having to travel a "more circuitous route" to reach its property.
The reason is obvious - having to go an additional 2.055 feet south on Vista A venue (iftraveling
south) or 4.480 feet less (if traveling north) is simply not a more "circuitous" route under any
legal or factual analysis. Moreover, HI Boise has made clear that, whether analyzed as a
"physical" or "non-physical" taking, its claim for damages for "increased circuity of travel" is not
caused by the slight movement of the driveway, but by changes in traffic volume, pattern, or flow.
6.

The Driveway on Vista Has Not Been Closed or Restricted.

ITD has not closed HI Boise's driveway on Vista Avenue. The driveway has not been
restricted to "right-in, right-out" turning movements. No raised median has been constructed in
the center of Vista Avenue restricting access to HI Boise's property, and no signs or pavement
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markings restrict full movement access to and from the HI Boise property from Vista Avenue in
any way. These facts are undisputed. See R000372-000373,
20-25; R000399-000400

~~

30-31; R000838-000839,

~~

~~

16-21; R000397-000398,

8-15; R000951,

~

~~

19,

6.

The lane configuration and road striping on Vista A venue are the same after the Project as
before. R000839,

~

13. Therefore, traffic flow is the same. R000838-000839; R000842-000843.

The Project also does not touch or affect HI Boise's driveways on Sunrise Rim Road in any way.
R000400,

~

7.

32; R000839,

~

19.

The Alleged Changes in Traffic Conditions on Vista Avenue Were Conditions
that Existed Before the Project or Were Not Caused by the Project.

The alleged changes in traffic conditions and traffic flow cited by HI Boise were already
present in the "before" condition prior to the Project. See R000842-000843; R000850-000860.
Traffic volume on Vista A venue was high before the Project and was projected to increase
significantly - whether the new freeway interchange was constructed or not. R000842; R000853.
Similarly, interference with left hand turning movements caused by traffic volume on Vista
A venue and stacking or backing up of vehicles at the Vista/Elder Street intersection down the
street from the HI Boise property were preexisting conditions and were not caused by the Project.
R000842,

~

31; R000851-000852. Most importantly, these conditions were not caused by the

slight movement of HI Boise's driveway on Vista.
For a detailed analysis showing that HI Boise's damage claims are contrary to undisputed
facts, see Supp. Aff. of Jason Brinkman (R000950-000968), and Supp. Aff. of Robert Jacobs
(R000836-000860).
8.

No "Permanent Ramp" Was Constructed on HI Boise's Property.

HI Boise alleges that lTD constructed a "permanent ramp" on its property. HI Boise App.
Brf., at 17, ~ 14. This is untrue.
[HI Boise] claims that the Project will require a "permanent ramp" on HI Boise's
property. This assertion is incorrect. lTD has a temporary construction easement
to reconstruct the driveway. After the completion of the Project, HI Boise will
have possession and control over its driveway. In addition, the driveway will not
have a "ramp" in the sense implied by Mr. Butler. The driveway will be a
standard configuration driveway. The slope of the driveway does not exceed the
standard set by the City of Boise for driveways within city limits. This is
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demonstrated in detail in the Supplemental Affidavit of Robert Jacobs, and
particularly in the graphics attached as Exhibit 7a and 7b to that affidavit.
Supp. Aff. of Jason Brinkman, at R000954-000955,
9.

~

20 (emphasis added).

Emergency Vehicles Can Readily Access the HI Boise Property.

In an attempt to justify its large claim for severance damages based on an alleged taking of
a right of access, HI Boise claimed that emergency vehicles cannot access its property after the
Project. This contention was tested and proven wrong. On August 26, 2010, the Boise Fire
Marshall personally supervised field testing by fire department personnel at the HI Boise property
using two different fire engines. This testing was conducted after the work on the HI Boise
property was completed. The Fire Marshall found the access to be safe, reasonable, and adequate.

See Decl. of Boise Fire Marshall Mark Senteno (R001837-001839).
The Fire Marshall proved that the fire engines could access the Vista Driveway even with
traffic cones and other restrictions that HI Boise's consultant placed in the driveway, which
blocked about halfthe width of the driveway. Id. The Fire Marshall also stated that the cones
and other restrictions placed in the driveway by HI Boise were completely unrealistic because,
in a real emergency, the lights and sirens of the fire trucks would clear all cars out of the Vista
Avenue driveway. !d. The Fire Marshall also concluded that the slope of the driveway presented
no problem and in fact was an improvement over the old driveway that existed before the Project,
which had an uneven slope and presented some difficulties for emergency vehicles. Id. The Fire
Marshall also found that the Department's fire engines could access the property via the HI Boise
driveways on Sunrise Rim Road, which HI Boise had previously argued was not possible. Id.

See also CR 000912-000937 (Exs. 6a to 6m - detailed turning movement simulations).
D.

lTD Has Not Condemned An Access Right Reserved By Deed.
HI Boise's predecessors reserved a right to a single access on Vista Avenue in two deeds

executed in 1967. The deeds are in the record at R000601-000602 and R000604-000606.
Contrary to HI Boise's claim, lTD has not condemned this access right. HI Boise had a fullmovement driveway on Vista Avenue before the Project, and it will have one in virtually the
identical location after the Project.
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For purposes of clarification, a "driveway" is the physical construction of a traveled
way across private property to a public road. R000962. An "approach" is also a physical feature
located at the intersection where the driveway and the public right-of-way meet. Id. A "right of
access" is the right to have an "approach" onto the public road. It is not a physical feature. Id.
The 1967 deeds did not reserve a right of access at a specific location. Rather, the deeds
described a general area for the placement of the approach. The deeds state that the access is to
be "Northeasterly of Station 24+53.01." !d. After the Project, the HI Boise driveway and
approach continue to be "Northeasterly of Station 24+53.01" and within the area described in the
1967 deeds. R000839,

~

18; R000843,

~

34. See also R000867 (aerial photograph with graphics

showing that the location of the driveway and approach continue to be well within the area
reserved in the 1967 deeds). The only change to the driveway approach is that it has been moved
2.055 feet south and 4.480 feet east. R000839,

~

17.

The driveway approach on Vista Avenue has been moved on prior occasions since 1967.
See R000966-000967,

~~

37-43. HI Boise does not dispute the fact that the driveway has been

moved on prior occasions, nor has it offered any contrary evidence despite having repeated
opportunities to do so before the district court. Therefore, if moving the location of the driveway
is a taking of the right of access, as argued by HI Boise, then the right of access was taken and
condemned when the driveway was moved in 1969 or at least by 1972 when it was moved again.
Id.
It is undisputed that HI Boise never obtained a permit to install or use a driveway

approach to perfect the right of access reserved in the 1967 deeds. R000953,
~

~

15; R000966,

39. Despite full opportunity to do so before the district court, including a Motion To Reconsider

filed by HI Boise with supporting affidavits and exhibits, HI Boise has not corne forward with a
permit or even a permit application. Without a permit, the access right was never perfected.
Based on the authority cited by HI Boise, without a permit for the access the location is not fixed.
State v. Bradley B., LLC, and Dillon Limited Partnership, et al., Fourth District Court Case

No. CV OC 08185194, at R000640 (district court opinion cited by HI Boise found at R000633-

lTD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 19

000642). Under the authority cited by HI Boise, if the location is not fixed, then it can be moved
without constituting a taking of the access right. !d. at R000640.
E.

No Structure Alleged To Block Visibility Of HI Boise's Property Is Located On
Property Condemned From HI Boise.

HI Boise's alleged loss of visibility is based on ITO's construction of a sound wall, a
freeway exit ramp, and replacement of the Vista Avenue overpass. See ROOI428-001429. It is
undisputed that the sound wall, exit ramp, and overpass were all constructed on existing ITO
right-of-way. It is likewise undisputed that no part of any of these structures was constructed on
property acquired from HI Boise. The only improvement constructed on the narrow strip of
property acquired from HI Boise was a new sidewalk. R0003 70, ~ 11. As found by the district
court:
12.
In the briefing and affidavits filed by the parties, it was undisputed that
none ofthe Project improvements referenced above [sound wall, overpass, exit
ramp], including the sound wall, were located on HI Boise property.
13.
At oral argument, counsel for HI Boise raised the possibility that a portion
of the sound wall may have been constructed on HI Boise's property. HI Boise
did not present any evidence to support the allegation either at the hearing or in
affidavits filed in opposition to ITD's motion for summary judgment. Therefore,
other than counsel's unsubstantiated statement at oral argument, it remains
undisputed that the sound wall is located on ITO's existing right-of-way.
R001971-001972 (brackets added).
IV.

THRESHOLD LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Idaho law, a property owner "cannot maintain an inverse condemnation action
unless there has actually been a taking of his or her property." KMST, LLC v. County ojAda, 138
Idaho 577, 581,67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003). In other words, "damage" to property without a taking
will not support a claim for inverse condemnation. Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho
777, 780, 53 P .3d 828, 831 (2002) (the Idaho Constitution only protects against takings of
property and does not provide compensation for mere damage).
The issue of whether a taking has occurred is a question oflaw for the court and is
properly decided on summary judgment. KMST, 138 Idaho at 581, 67 P.3d at 60; Killinger v.
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Twin Falls Hwy. Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 325, 17 P.3d 266,269 (2000); Brown v. City of Twin Falls,

124 Idaho 39, 41, 855 P.2d 876, 878 (1993).
The court has full authority to determine as a matter of law whether a taking of access
has occurred. Brown, 124 Idaho at 44,855 P.2d at 881 (affirming summary judgment that, as a
matter of law, the State's limitation of access did not constitute a taking); Merritt v. State, 113
Idaho 142, 144-45, 742 P.2d 397, 399-400 (1987) (reversing trial court's denial of summary
judgment and holding that no taking had occurred where there was no destruction of vehicular
access and remaining access was reasonable).

V.

SUMMARY OF GROUNDS FOR AFFIRMING DISMISSAL
OF HI BOISE'S ACCESS CLAIM

HI Boise's claim for inverse condemnation of access should be dismissed in this appeal on
the following grounds.
1.

lTD has not taken or condemned any access of HI Boise.

2.

HI Boise's claim for damages is based on traffic conditions and pattern oftraffic

flow and such claims are barred by Idaho law.
3.

HI Boise quotes dicta from State ex rei. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d

60 (1958), that "all inconveniences" suffered by the remainder property in a partial taking case are
compensable. However, the actual rulings in Fonburg held that most ofthe forms of damages
sought by the property owner in that case were barred by law and not compensable.
4.

Idaho law prohibits recovery of damages for changes or construction on land

owned by others and not on the condemned property.
5.

lTD has not condemned the right of access reserved by deed in 1967. HI Boise's

driveway on Vista is not being closed or restricted and will remain in the location reserved in the
deeds.
6.

HI Boise did not perfect the right of access by obtaining the necessary permit for

access on Vista Avenue. Having failed to perfect its right, HI Boise had no deeded access right
for lTD to condemn.
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7.

The HI Boise driveway on Vista Avenue has been moved in the course of prior

road construction projects. If moving the driveway constitutes a taking of the right of access, as
argued by HI Boise, then the right of access was taken and condemned many years ago.
8.

HI Boise cannot recover severance damages based on a more "circuitous route."

The slight movement of the driveway approach does not constitute a more circuitous route and
did not cause the damages alleged to arise from a more circuitous route.
9.

The traffic conditions relied on by HI Boise as the basis for its damage claim all

existed in the before condition or would occur whether the Project had been built or not. Since
the Project did not cause these conditions, HI Boise cannot recover severance damages based on
them.

VI.
A.

ARGUMENT ON ACCESS CLAIMS

lTD Has Not Taken Or Closed HI Boise's Access On Vista Avenue.
lTD has not taken or closed HI Boise's access to Vista Avenue. HI Boise still has a

driveway on Vista Avenue at the same location. Full turning movements to and from the
HI Boise driveway continue to be permitted. Access is not restricted to "right-in, right-out."
No physical barriers, signs, or pavement markings prohibit any turning movements to or from the
driveway in any way. After the Project, HI Boise has four, full-movement accesses to the public
road system. No cases decided by this Court support a finding of a taking of access under these
conditions.
Since no access has been taken, HI Boise cannot recover compensation or severance
damages for condemnation of access. Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 210-11, 596 P.2d 75, 82-3
(1978) (Bakes, J., concurring specially) (court must first find that a taking occurred before
addressing question of just compensation); Merritt, 113 Idaho at 145, 742 P.2d at 400 ("there
having been no destruction of vehicular access to the Merritt property, and the remaining
vehicular access being reasonable, there was no taking of the Merritt's property which would
entitle him to compensation.").
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B.

Idaho Law Bars Claims For Damages In Condemnation Cases Based On Changes In
Traffic Flow, Volumes, and Patterns.

HI Boise's claim for loss of access is based on traffic conditions. Specifically, in its
briefing and affidavits, HI Boise contends that it will lose full movement of the Vista Avenue
driveway because of increased traffic and the manner in which traffic flows on Vista. See Section
III.(C)(5) above.
1.

Idaho Case Law Bars Claims for Damages Based on Traffic.

The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that damages caused by changes in traffic
flow, volumes, patterns, or routes are not compensable in an eminent domain proceeding. See
lTD Brf., R000459-000461 and cases cited therein. In each of these cases, the Court has held that
the right of access to a public road does not encompass a right to any particular access from any
particular road, or a right to any particular pattern or flow of traffic. See Brown, 124 Idaho at 4144, 855 P.2d at 879-81 (analyzing Bastian, Merritt, and Powell).

State ex reI. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,546 P.2d 399 (1976), involved a project to
improve a state highway. Id. at 446,546 P.2d at 401. The State condemned a portion ofthe
Bastians' property along Addison Avenue in Twin Falls, and condemned a portion of the
Bastians' property along Washington Street. Id. As part of the project, the State constructed a
raised center median on Addison Avenue, which prohibited left turns in and out of the Bastians'
property on Addison Avenue. Id. The State also painted a double yellow line median on
Washington Street. Id. The Bastians then sought compensation for the value of the land taken
and severance damages due to the restrictions on access to their property. Id.
The trial court let the Bastians present evidence of damages caused by restrictions on
access, and the Idaho Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 447,546 P.2d at 402. The Court held that
"[ w ]hile it is true that defendants have a property interest in access to public streets ...
nevertheless not all impairments of that right . .. or by the State are compensable or per se
unreasonable." Id. (emphasis added). This ruling directly refutes HI Boise's contention, based on
its incorrect reading of Fonburg (discussed below), that all impairments and inconveniences are
compensable.
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The Idaho Supreme Court further held:
That right of access does not encompass a right to any particular pattern of traffic
flow or a right of direct access to or from both directions of traffic and we find no
compensable impairment of access here. All who wish to reach defendants'
property could do so with relatively minor inconvenience.

Id. This holding squarely refutes HI Boise's reading of Fonburg. Here, the Idaho Supreme Court
acknowledged that the project would result in inconvenience to the remainder property, but
denied compensation for that inconvenience. By contrast, HI Boise insists that all inconveniences
are compensable under Fonburg. HI Boise's argument is squarely refuted by both Fonburg and

Bastian.
HI Boise attempts to distinguish Bastian by arguing that the Court's decision "dealt solely
only with the regulatory takings aspect of the road widening project at issue, and had no impact
on the property owner's ability to assert all damages resulting from the physical taking, as
established in Fonburg and Covington." HI Boise App. Brf., at 42. This statement clearly shows
the fallacy of HI Boise's argument and its reliance on Fonburg. Bastian involved both a physical
taking and a claim by the property owner for damages based on changes in traffic flow. This is
precisely the situation here. The Court in Bastian specifically reversed the trial court rulings and
jury award for allowing evidence of damages caused by restrictions in turning movements and
changes in traffic pattern, making Bastian squarely on point. !d. at 447,546 P.2d at 402.
2.

The Majority of States Bar Claims for Damages in Condemnation Cases
Based on Traffic Flows, Patterns, or Routes.

The vast majority of courts across the country are in agreement with Idaho that no
compensable deprivation of property occurs where reasonable access remains or where a less
convenient or more circuitous means of access is created. See lTD Brf., R000461-000462 and
cases cited therein.
C.

The District Court Applied The Correct Legal Standard To HI Boise's Access Claim.
1.

Introduction.

HI Boise's argument regarding regulatory versus physical takings cases is misleading
because HI Boise seeks to recover damages that are not caused by the physical taking, but are
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based solely on changes in traffic flow and pattern outside of and beyond its property. By seeking
to recover these damages, HI Boise has made all of the cases addressing whether the "right of
access" includes a right to a particular pattern or flow of traffic directly applicable.
HI Boise's attempt to recover damages based on changes in traffic conditions is clearly
barred by Idaho law, as ruled by the district court in its Order of July 23, 2010. The fact that this
case involves a physical taking of property does not change the law barring that claim.

2.

The District Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard.

The district court dismissed HI Boise's claim for damages based on changes in the pattern
of traffic flow. In reaching that decision, the court properly cited and relied on condemnation
cases decided by this Court that have specifically addressed this claim. The Court has addressed
this claim in cases involving physical takings and in cases without physical takings. The Court
has denied this claim in all cases.
HI Boise cites Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 53 P.3d 828 (2002), for
the proposition that "it is inappropriate" to apply cases involving regulatory takings to cases
involving physical takings. !d. at 781,53 P.3d at 832 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe
Reg 'I Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002)). However, nothing in either
Covington or Tahoe-Sierra suggests that a particular form of damage cannot be barred in both

physical and regulatory taking cases.

3.

The Rule of Law Denying Damages Based on Changes in the Pattern of
Traffic Flow Applies in All Condemnation Cases Where the Claim is Made.

Contrary to HI Boise's arguments, the rule barring recovery of damages based on changes
in traffic flow or pattern applies in all condemnation cases where such claims are made. For
example, in Bastian, a case involving a physical taking and traffic control measures, the Idaho
Supreme Court relied on non-physical takings cases such as James v. State, 88 Idaho 172,397
P.2d 766 (1964), and Mabe v. State, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P.2d 799 (1961), in holding that a property
owner in a physical taking case has no right to a particular pattern of traffic flow. Bastian, at 447,
546 P.2d at 402. Thereafter, non-physical takings cases, such as Brown, 124 Idaho at 42-43,855
P.2d at 879-80, have relied on Bastian for the same proposition. See id., at 43,855 P.2d at 880
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(holding that the claim for loss of access in Brown based on raised medians was
"indistinguishable" from the claim in Bastian where a physical taking occurred in addition to
construction of raised medians).
In Brown, which HI Boise characterizes as a "regulatory taking" case, the property owners
argued that the city's placement of raised medians in the road adjacent to their property
constituted a taking without just compensation. Relying on Bastian and Powell v. McKelvey, 56
Idaho 291, 53 P.2d 626 (1935), the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that no taking had occurred and
that the claims in Bastian and Brown were "indistinguishable."
We find the Browns' claim to be indistinguishable from the claims made in
Bastian and Powell. Although the Browns characterize their claim as one
involving a limitation of access, they are primarily asserting the right to have
traffic traveling south on Blue Lakes Boulevard and west on Addison Avenue
access their property by making a left hand tum across oncoming traffic instead of
traveling an additional block or two which the medians now require. Since that
"right" has been interfered with, the Browns request damages for a taking of their
property. However, similar to the plaintiffs in both the Bastian and Powell cases,
the Browns do not have a property right in the way traffic flows on the streets
abutting their property ... We find the situation in this case to be indistinguishable
from those of Bastian and Powell.

Brown, 124 Idaho at 43,855 P.2d at 880 (emphasis added).
This ruling by the Idaho Supreme Court is dispositive of HI Boise's argument that socalled "regulatory" condemnation cases are treated differently from "physical taking" cases on the
issue of whether a property owner can recover damages based on an alleged right to a particular
pattern of traffic flow or damages arising from changes in traffic flow or pattern. In Brown, a
"non-physical" taking case, the Court held that the claim in Bastian, a "physical" taking case, and
the claim in Brown were "indistinguishable." 124 Idaho at 43,855 P.2d at 880. Thus, the rule in
Idaho is universal: no property owner has a property right "in the way traffic flows on the streets
abutting their property," id., at 43, 855 P.2d at 880, or, as phrased in Bastian, "a right to any
particular pattern of traffic flow or a right of direct access to or from both directions of traffic .... "

Bastian, 97 Idaho at 447,546 P.2d at 402.
Since, HI Boise has no protected property right "in the way traffic flows on the streets
abutting [its] property," and no "right to any particular pattern of traffic flow or a right of direct
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access to or from both directions of traffic," it cannot recover damages for changes in the way
traffic flows on Vista Avenue or changes in the pattern of traffic on Vista.
4.

Bastian has Ample Support in the Law.

HI Boise attempts to make Bastian appear to be an aberration, without support in the law.
However, it has been cited and relied on by other decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and is in
accord with decisions from other states. In fact, courts from across the country have held that

actual, physical restrictions ofleft hand turning movements do not constitute a taking of access,
even when accompanied by a physical taking of a portion ofthe landowner's property. See, e.g.,
State v. Kimco o/Evansville, Inc., 902 N.E.2d 206, 208-09, 213-16 (Ind. 2009) (in case involving
taking of a portion of property, property owner could not recover damages for loss of turning
movements due to restriction permitting only right-in and right-out turning movements to
shopping center); City ofJacksonville v. Twin Restaurants, Inc., 953 So. 2d 720, 721-24 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing trial court's admission of evidence of damages due to loss of leftin and left-out turning movements, in case that also involved a physical taking of property, on
grounds that "landowners have no compensable interest in traffic flow.") (quoting Division of

Administration, State Dept. of Transp. v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 397 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 1981»;
State v. Ensley, 164 N.E.2d 342,347-48 (Ind. 1960) (holding that construction ofa centerline
raised median restricting traffic to right-inJright-out was not compensable even when
accompanied by the taking of a piece of the landowners' property to widen the road).
If actual physical barriers blocking left-hand turns do not constitute a taking, then
certainly no recovery can be had by HI Boise since no such barriers have been constructed in this
case and all turning movements are permitted.
5.

Fonburg Does Not Support HI Boise's Contention that, in a Condemnation
Case Involving a Physical Taking, Any and All Possible Forms of Damage Are
Compensable.

In an attempt to recover damages barred by Idaho law, HI Boise relies on an isolated quote
from State ex ref. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,328 P.2d 60 (1958):
Where a part of the owner's contiguous land is taken in a condemnation
proceeding, all inconveniences resulting to the owner's remaining land, including
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an easement or access to a road or right of way formerly enjoyed, which decrease
the value of the land retained by the owner, are elements of severance damage for
which compensation should be paid.
Id. at 278, 328 P .2d at 64. HI Boise contends that this statement allows it to recover any and all

forms of "damages" it claims to have suffered, even ifIdaho law bars the damage claims and even
if the Project did not cause the alleged "damages."
In addition to being contrary to many more recent Idaho Supreme Court cases, HI Boise's
argument is contrary to the actual holdings in Fonburg. In its rulings on severance damages in
the case, the Idaho Supreme Court denied recovery for most of the "inconveniences" for which
the property owner sought compensation. Therefore, the quote relied on by HI Boise is simply
dicta.
In Fonburg, the property owner's farm abutted and had access to State Highway 95. Id. at
274,328 P.2d at 61. The State was engaged in a project to construct a new four-lane limited
access highway. Id. at 274,328 P.2d at 61-2. As part of the project, the State condemned 12.76
acres ofFonburg's land for the construction ofthe new highway. Id. The new highway was
relocated and did not follow the route of the old highway, but instead ran along "the north side of
defendant's land and south of the Camas Prairie Railroad." Id. at 62,328 P.2d at 274. As part of
its acquisition, the State condemned Fonburg's right to access the new highway. Id. The project
also eliminated the old highway where it abutted Fonburg's land:
The new road, when constructed, will eliminate the section of highway No. 95,
where it now abuts and crosses defendant's land, and will destroy the existent for
easement for ingress and egress from his land to said highway No. 95, and
connecting points, formerly enjoyed.
Id. The facts in Fonburg contrast sharply to the present case. Here, no access is being taken,

closed, or restricted. In Fonburg, the property owner was denied access to the new highway and
all access to the old highway was destroyed, leaving Fonburg with no access. The opening of
Fonburg's brief before the Idaho Supreme Court shows that the State condemned all access:
The State filed its Complaint herein asking condemnation of the fee simple title to
a strip ofland extending the full length of appellants' farm, 300 feet in width on
the west end where the easement for ingress and egress to and from appellant's
land to public roads, including U.S. Highway No. 95 exists, and is in use and
which wide right-ol-way takes the entire possible access from appellant's land to
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existing public highways and narrowing considerably on the east end where no
access is possible.
R001831-001835 (Appellant's Opening Brie/in State v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60
(1958) (emphasis added).
On appeal, Fonburg challenged the refusal ofthe district court to instruct the jury on a
number of forms of severance damages he sought to recover based on loss of access. The only
claim the Idaho Supreme Court agreed with, however, was that the jury should have been
instructed on "claimed severance damages because of destroyed or curtailed access to highway
No. 95, as formerly enjoyed .... " Id. at 65, 328 P.2d at 279.
Contrary to HI Boise's argument in this case, Fonburg was not allowed to recover for
"all inconveniences" caused by the project. For example, Fonburg's residence was located on the
other side of the railroad tracks that ran through the middle of his land, and he sought severance
damages for the loss of convenient access to his property on the other side of the railroad. !d. at
277,328 P.2d at 64. The Court ruled that Fonburg could not recover the severance damages
sought because the two parcels were not contiguous, being split by the railroad line. Id. Next, the
Court ruled that Fonburg was not entitled to severance damages for not being able to have access
to the new highway, which was certainly an inconvenience to the remainder property:
Nor is the condemnee entitled to damages because he is not granted unrestricted
access to the new part of the road being constructed. There is no inherent right of
access to a newly relocated highway. The new highway not being in existence
prior to the present construction, the landowner would suffer no compensable
damages because his access to the new construction was denied him. The
condemnee never having had access to the new highway there is no easement or
access taken in this proceeding.
Id. at 277,328 P.2d at 64.

The Idaho Supreme Court also rejected claims by Fonburg "to recover various severance
damages for non-contiguous parcels ofland and matter not within the pertinent issues." Id. at
278,328 P.2d at 64. Thus, the holdings in Fonburg make clear that most of the "inconveniences"
for which Fonburg sought recovery were denied and held not to be takings of a property right or
compensable as severance damages.
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The Court in Fonburg denied claims for damages barred by Idaho law, despite the fact
that the barred claims represented "inconveniences" to the property owner. Therefore Fonburg,
in keeping with many subsequent decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court on the issues presented,
provides no basis for HI Boise to recover severance damages for claims barred by Idaho law.

D.

The Alleged Changes In Traffic Conditions Cited By HI Boise Were Not Caused By
Movement Of HI Boise's Driveway.
None ofthe traffic conditions for which HI Boise seeks to recover damages were caused

by the movement of the approach to its driveway on Vista Avenue. Moving the driveway
approach 2.055 feet south and 4.480 feet east did not cause traffic to increase on Vista Avenue.
Moving the driveway approach did not cause traffic lines at the Vista/Elder intersection down the
street from the HI Boise property. Moreover, all of the traffic conditions cited by HI Boise as a
basis for it to recover damages existed before the Project. R000842,

~

30. None were caused by

the movement of HI Boise's driveway.

E.

An Increase In Traffic Is Not A Taking And Is Not Compensable.
HI Boise has not cited any cases (including any physical taking cases) that hold that an

increase in traffic or a change in the manner that traffic flows is a compensable taking of access,
or that it is the equivalent of closing or eliminating an access, constructing a barrier across an
access, or building a center median in a roadway to close or restrict access. HI Boise's claim for
the alleged taking or restriction of access based on traffic volume or a change in the pattern of
traffic flow has no support in the law and this appeal should be denied.
In addition to the many Idaho cases barring HI Boise's claim, case law from other states
make clear that an increase in traffic is not a taking and is not compensable in a condemnation
case. See, e.g., Dept. o/Transp. v. Fisher, 958 So. 2d 586, 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
("Because a property owner has no right to a specific level of traffic flow, the question of whether
access has been diminished or destroyed must focus on physical access to the property itself - not
the amount of traffic that can or will pass by the property post construction.") (citation omitted);
Adams v. Dept. o/Highways o/State o/Mont., 753 P.2d 846,850-51 (Mont. 1988) (damages
caused by difficulty of ingress and egress due to increased traffic from project are not
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compensable); Com., Dept. ofHwys. v. Deloteus, 444 S.W.2d 743, 744-45 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969)
(striking evidence of damages from increased traffic resulting from road project); City of Berkeley

v. von Adelung, 214 Cal. App. 2d 791, 792, 29 Cal. Rptr. 802, 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (property
owner held not to be entitled to damages due to a 300% increase in traffic resulting from road
expansion project).

F.

A Change In The Degree Of Difficulty Of Left-Hand Turning Movements Is Not A
Taking Of Property Or A Property Right And Is Not Compensable.
HI Boise seeks damages on the grounds that left hand turns will be more difficult after the

Project. As noted above, numerous decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court have held that medians
and other traffic control devices that restrict left-hand turning movements do not constitute a
taking of a private right or private property. No such restrictions have been constructed by this
Project. Therefore, HI Boise's claim for compensation based on non-existent restrictions on lefthand turning movements necessarily fails as a matter oflaw.
No authority exists to support a claim for compensation based on a change in the degree
of difficulty of making left hand turns into and out of property by motorists. On the contrary,
cases from across the country have held that actual, physical restrictions of left hand turning
movements do not constitute a taking of access, even when accompanied by a physical taking ofa

portion of the landowner's property. See Section VI.(C)(4) above and cases cited therein.
G.

Idaho Law Bars Claims For Damages Caused By Changes Or Construction On
Property Not Condemned From HI Boise.
Idaho has long followed the rule of eminent domain law that if alleged damages originate

from land not taken from the property owner in a condemnation case then, as a matter oflaw, the
landowner is not entitled to damages. See Oregon- Washington R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 34
Idaho 601, 202 P. 1065, 1066 (1921).
This rule of law originates first from Idaho's constitution, which limits claims to
compensation to instances in which property is "taken" and not merely "damaged." Idaho Const.
art. 1, § 14. See also Covington, 137 Idaho at 780,53 P.3d at 831. This rule is reflected in the
provisions ofIdaho's eminent domain statutes, which limit damages to impacts resulting from the
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severing ofland by physical taking of property and "the construction ofthe improvement in
the manner proposed by the plaintiff." Idaho Code § 7-711(1)(a). See also Idaho Code § 7711(2)(b).
In 1921, the Idaho Supreme Court construed § 7-711 (1)( a) (codified under a different
number, but containing the identical language as the current version) in Oregon-Washington R. &

Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 34 Idaho 601,202 P. 1065 (1921). In Campbell, the condemnor sought to
acquire 120 acres of land belonging to the Campbells to construct a railroad. Id. at 1065-1066.
As part of their claim for just compensation, the Campbells sought to introduce evidence of
damages to a stream that ran through their remaining property caused by construction of the
railroad line on property not owned by them. !d. The trial court excluded the evidence. Id. On
appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision based, in part, on the fact that
the damage to the stream was caused by construction of the railroad on land that was beyond the
land owned by the Campbells and condemned by the railroad. Id. As stated by the Court, "the
damages thus complained of were occasioned by construction of the railroad on land outside the
tract owned by appellants, and did not in any way result from the taking of appellants land." Id.
Accordingly, the evidence of the alleged damages could not be presented to the jury and
compensation for the damages could not be recovered. Id.
Based on the Idaho Supreme Court's decision and !claho's constitution and eminent
domain statutes, HI Boise cannot, as a matter oflaw, recover damages that result from changes or
construction on land not owned or taken from HI Boise, such as Vista Avenue and other roads
and intersections. Rather, the recovery of damages is limited to those damages that result from
the taking of HI Boise's land. Id.
The United States Supreme Court has also limited claims for severance damages to
damages actually caused by the use ofthe condemned portion of the land. Campbell v. Us., 266
U.S. 368, 372 (1924). As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court:
[t]he rule supported by better reason and the weight of authority is that the just
compensation assured by the Fifth Amendment to an owner, a part of whose land
is taken for public use, does not include the diminution in value of the remainder
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caused by the acquisition and use of adjoining lands of others for the same
undertaking.
Campbell v. Us., 266 U.S. at 372.

Following the rule adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court,
HI Boise cannot recover damages for alleged loss of access due to traffic conditions on Vista
Avenue or other changes or construction on land not condemned from HI Boise.
H.

Idaho Law Defining "Severance Damages" Bars Damage Claims That Are Not
Caused By The Use Of The Condemned Property.
In Idaho, "[i]t is a well-established principle that where the public's use of the condemned

land diminishes the value of other adjoining, untaken property, the owner is entitled to recover
this loss (typically referred to as 'severance damage') in addition to the value of the invaded
land." C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Hwy. Dist. No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 148, 75 P.3d 194,202 (2003).
Thus, "severance damages" encompass only those damages that arise from the "public's use of
the condemned land." In this case, lTD condemned 960 square feet. The public use ofthe 960
square feet is a sidewalk. The only damages HI Boise is entitled to recover are damages that
arise from that use. HI Boise cannot recover severance damages for traffic on Vista Avenue,
changes in traffic volume or flow, or difficulties in turning movements caused by traffic beyond
HI Boise's property. Those damages are not caused by the movement ofthe driveway or
construction of the new sidewalk, and are barred as a matter oflaw.
I.

lTD Has Not Condemned An Access Right Reserved By Deed.
1.

The Access Right Reserved by Deed Has Not Been Taken.

HI Boise contends that lTD has condemned an "access right" reserved by deed in 1967
by moving the Vista Avenue driveway 2.055 feet south and 4.480 feet east. The deeds referred
to by HI Boise are in the record at R00060 1-000602, and R000604-000606. lTD has not
condemned the access right. The deeded access right remains in full force and effect. R000953,
~

16. The driveway on Vista A venue continues to be within the area reserved for the access in the

1967 deeds: "Northeasterly of Station 24+53.0l." R000839,

~

18. See also R000867 (aerial

photograph with graphics demonstrating that the location of the driveway remains well within the
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area reserved in the 1967 deeds). The only change to the driveway is that it has been moved
2.055 feet south and 4.480 feet east. R000839,

~

17.

The following definitions help to assess this claim properly.
Driveway: the physical feature (usually made of concrete, asphalt, or gravel) traveled
across and upon in the act of moving between a public road and an abutting piece of
private property. R000962.
Approach: the physical feature (usually made of concrete or asphalt) connecting the
outside curb line of a public road and an abutting private property at the roadway right-ofway, being co-located with that portion of a driveway existing within the public right-ofway, and intended to provide access to the public roadway. !d.
Access: the right and/or ability to enter or leave a public roadway right-of-way from an
abutting private property, and is not a physical construction. Id.
With the Project completed, the "access" for HI Boise to Vista Avenue is still
Northeasterly from Station 24+53.02. R000963. The "approach" is still centered at Station
24+82 as it was before the Project. !d. The new approach has been constructed in line with, and
entirely within the bounds of, the existing driveway located on Vista Avenue before the Project.
Id.

Thus, all statements regarding a "taking" of an "access right" are incorrect. The right of
access on Vista Avenue, meaning the right to enter or leave Vista Avenue, has not been taken or
closed by the Project. R000962. Moreover, the claim by HI Boise that LTD did not establish a
new access right or easement following the slight movement of the driveway "approach" is
misleading. lTD did not take, destroy, or extinguish an access right or easement. Therefore, any
prior right, to the extent it still existed at the time of this Project, still exists. R000963.
2.

The District Court Decision Cited by HI Boise Does Not Support Its Claim of
Taking of an Access Right in this Case.

To support its claim that the access right has been condemned, HI Boise relies on a district
court decision in State v. Bradley B., LLC, and Dillon Limited Partnership, et al. ("Dillon")
(R000633-000640). HI Boise's reliance on Dillon is misplaced for the following reasons.
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First, the case is far different factually:

*

In Dillon, the property owner had obtained a permit for the access, and thus had
perfected its access right. See Id. at 2 (R000634). In the case at hand, HI Boise
never obtained a permit. R000953, ~ 15, and R000966, ~ 39.

*

In Dillon, the new driveway was moved 110 feet north of the original driveway.
Dillon, at 2 (R000634). Here, the driveway to HI Boise's property from Vista
Avenue only moved 2.055 feet to the south. The HI Boise driveway is still within
the area defined in the deeds. R00083 9, ~~ 17, 18 and Ex. 3.

*

In Dillon, the driveway had remained in the same location since the reservation
of access. Dillon, at 8 (R000638). Here, the driveway has been moved in the
course of other road improvement projects. R000966-000967, ~~ 40-43.

Second, the legal analysis in Dillon supports lTD, not HI Boise. The Dillon decision first
cites II NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.07[2][b] (3d. ed. 2006). The essential point of the
citation is that a landowner is only entitled to compensation if the public use "destroys or impairs
enjoyment of the use of the easement .... " !d. at 6 (R000638) (citing NICHOLS) (emphasis
added). Here, HI Boise will continue to have full use and enjoyment of the access right and in
virtually the identical location.
Next, the Dillon decision cites case law to the effect that once the location of an
indefinitely-described easement is fixed in accordance with law, it cannot be moved without the
consent of the easement holder. Id. at 7-8 (R000639-000640). In Dillon, the court found that the
location had become fixed because the property owner had properly "applied for, and received a
pennit to establish its contractual access right where the original driveway was located." Id. at 8
(R000640). Since the property owner had applied for and obtained a permit for the driveway in
its chosen location, the court held that the location could not be changed. Here, despite repeated
opportunities to do so, including a Motion to Reconsider filed by HI Boise with affidavits and
exhibits, HI Boise has offered no evidence that it ever applied for or obtained a pennit "to
establish its contractual access right where the original driveway was located." !d. On the
contrary, the record shows that HI Boise never obtained a permit for an access in the area reserved
in the 1967 deeds. R000953,

~

15, and R000966,

~

39. Consequently, under the legal analysis in

Dillon, HI Boise never established its contractual right of access and never fixed a location for the
access.
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Since the access right reserved by deed was never perfected, HI Boise had no access right
for ITO to condemn. Despite the defect of failing to obtain the required permit to obtain legal
access on Vista A venue, lTD has not condemned or restricted the access. It continues to honor
the access. R000953,

~

16.

Third, the 1967 deeds do not guarantee full-movement access. Therefore, access could be
restricted to right-in, right-out. In fact, the driveway was limited by signs and pavement striping
to only right-in, right-out turns from 1972 to approximately 1990. R000966-000967,

~~

37-43.

ITO has not imposed any such restriction in this case.
Similarly, the deeds reserving a right of access did not assert a right to have a limit placed
on the volume oftraffic on Vista Avenue. A provision of that nature would not be enforceable as
a matter of public policy. It also could not be enforced as a practical matter, because lTD has no
ability to stop traffic growth and has no jurisdiction over Vista Avenue (which is controlled by
ACHD). R000953,

~

14. Moreover, it is undisputed that traffic volumes have increased steadily

on Vista Avenue from 1967 to the present. Therefore, any contention that increased traffic
interferes with or is contrary to the terms of the deeds reserving access is contrary to law and the
terms of the deeds. Nothing in the Dillon decision and no factual or legal basis exists for finding
that HI Boise's right of access has been "taken."
Under HI Boise's Reasoning, the Right of Access Reserved by Deed was
Condemned and Extinguished by No Later than 1972.

3.

HI Boise argues that moving the driveway "approach" constitutes a taking of the "right of
access." The following undisputed facts show that the driveway has been moved at least twice,
and has been restricted to "right-in, right-out" in the past.
•

The Holiday Inn was built before the Vista Interchange was constructed in 1969.

•

The Holiday Inn had a driveway or approach onto Vista A venue prior to
construction ofthe Vista Interchange Project in 1969.

•

As part of the Vista Interchange Project, lTD acquired property from the Holiday
Inn in 1967. In the deeds conveying that property, the Holiday Inn reserved a right
of access to Vista Avenue, stating that the access would be "Northeasterly of
Station 24+53.01."
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•

As part of the 1969 project to build the first Vista Interchange, lTD moved and
reconstructed the Holiday Inn driveway on Vista.

•

As part of that same project, ITD also installed a second driveway to the north, to
be shared by the Holiday Inn and a gas station on the corner of Vista and Elder.

•

In 1972, ITD engaged in another project involving portions of Vista Avenue where
the Holiday Inn is located.

•

As part of the 1972 project, ITD moved and reconstructed the main driveway to
the Holiday Inn on Vista. It also closed the fonner joint use access to the north
and replaced it with two separate driveways.

•

Therefore, the Holiday Inn driveways on Vista Avenue were moved and the sizes
were changed in the lTD project in 1972.

•

The approaches to the Holiday Inn property were restricted to right-in, right-out
turning movements by a median in Vista Avenue following the 1972 project. This
condition remained in effect until approximately 1990.

See ROOI793-001799.

Based on these facts, it is undisputed that the Vista Avenue driveway was moved in 1969
and again in 1972. Therefore, if moving the driveway constitutes a taking of the right of access,
as argued by HI Boise, the right of access reserved by deed was taken and condemned in 1969.
At the latest, the right was condemned when the driveway was moved again in 1972.
Accordingly, the right of access no longer existed when ITD brought this action. Moreover, any
claim for taking of the access right is now time barred. See Idaho Code § 5-224; McCuskey v.
Canyon Cty. Com'rs, 128 Idaho 213,216,912 P.2d 100, 103 (1996) ("limitations period for

inverse condemnation claims is contained in I.C. § 5-224 ... ").
In summary, the right of access reserved by deed was never perfected by a pennit. The
right was also taken and condemned by no later than 1972. Therefore, HI Boise had no deeded
right of access at the time of the current Project and no deeded right of access has been
condemned in this case. Nevertheless, lTD is not closing or restricting HI Boise's driveway to
Vista Avenue and is honoring the right of access to Vista Avenue "Northeasterly of Station
24+53.01." Under these circumstances, HI Boise's claim that it should be allowed to recover
damages for the taking of an access right has no legal or factual basis and the claim should be
dismissed on appeal.
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J.

Even If lTD Had Closed HI Boise's Driveway On Vista Avenue, It Would Not Be A
Taking.

In certain, limited circumstances, the State's regulation of access may constitute a taking.
Weaver v. Village of Ban croft, 92 Idaho 189, 193,439 P.2d 697, 701 (1968); Hughes v. State of
Idaho, 80 Idaho 286, 295-96, 328 P.2d 397, 402 (1958); Village ofSandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho

749,95 P. 945, 948 (1908). See Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 144, 742 P.2d 397, 399 (1986)
(discussing these cases). In each of these cases, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that all
vehicular access to the property had been "destroyed," and therefore the property owner had a
"right to regain access to the public road or to be compensated for the taking of access." Id.; see
also Weaver, 92 Idaho at 193,439 P.2d at 701; Hughes, 80 Idaho at 295-96,328 P.2d at 402;
Doyle, 14 Idaho at 758-60, 95 P. at 947-48.

Accordingly, if all rights of access to a public road are destroyed - meaning that the
property is left without any means of ingress or egress to any public street or road - a

compensabl e taking of property has occurred. Merritt, 113 Idaho at 144, 742 P.2d at 399. See
also Brown, 124 Idaho at 43,855 P.2d at 880 (where there is "no destruction of vehicular access"

and the remaining vehicular access is reasonable, then there is no taking and no compensation
owed).
In this case, even if lTD had closed the driveway on Vista Avenue, HI Boise would
continue to have reasonable access, in the form of three, full-movement driveways on Sunrise·
Rim Road, as a means of ingress and egress to its property from a public street after the Project.
Therefore, ifITD had closed the Vista Avenue access, it would not constitute a taking. Even in
Merritt, the Idaho Supreme Court held that no taking occurred. In Merritt, the Court held that no

taking had occurred because the property still had access in the "after" condition, even though the
main commercial access to the property had been closed entirely and one ofthe only remaining
accesses was through an alley. Merritt, 113 Idaho at 143-45, 742 P.2d at 398-400.
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K.

HI Boise's Claim For Inverse Condemnation Of Access Also Fails On The Facts.
1.

Movement of the Driveway Approach on Vista Avenue Did Not Change
Traffic Conditions on Vista A venue.

HI Boise's claim for damages based on traffic conditions is barred because the conditions
it cites as causing damage all existed before the Project. See R000842,

~

30 (all of the traffic

conditions noted by Mr. Dobie are already present in the existing condition or will occur or
worsen even ifthe interchange Project is not built); and ~ 31 (traffic lines at the Vista/Elder
intersection causing stacking past HI Boise driveway on Vista and interfering with left hand turns
in and out of HI Boise is an existing condition); and R000852 (same). In addition, traffic volumes
on Vista Avenue were projected to increase whether the Project was built or not. Id. at ~ 30, and
R000853-000854. It is axiomatic that if the public project did not cause the alleged damages, no
compensation can be had.
2.

Emergency Vehicles Have No Difficulty Accessing the HI Boise Property
Using the Vista Avenue Driveway.

HI Boise's contentions regarding access by emergency vehicles have been squarely
refuted by the Boise Fire Marshall, who personally oversaw field testing with two different fire
engines at the HI Boise property on August 26, 2010. He found the access to be safe, reasonable,
and adequate. See Decl. of Boise Fire Marshall Mark Senteno (R001837-001839).
3.

HI Boise's Driveway is Four Feet Wider than Standard Commercial
Driveways in Ada County. Therefore, if HI Boise's Claims Were True,
No Emergency Vehicles or Commercial Truck Traffic Could Access any
Commercial Property in Boise.

Under ACHD guidelines (which apply to Vista Avenue), standard commercial driveways
are 36 feet wide in the City of Boise and the rest of Ada County. R001818. lTD provided HI
Boise with an even wider driveway of 40 feet. R001820. Forty feet is the width of an industrial
driveway, and is the widest driveway allowed in Ada County. Standard commercial driveways
with a width of36 feet are used all over the City of Boise and Ada County. R001821. If HI
Boise's claim that its driveway is not wide enough to accommodate emergency or commercial
truck traffic were true, then no emergency vehicles and no commercial truck traffic could access
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any of the commercial or industrial driveways anywhere in Boise or Ada County, which is
certainly not the case.
In addition, HI Boise has landscaping walls that border each side of its driveway.
ROO 1821. The walls were not moved and the width of the driveway between the walls was not

changed by the Project. Thus, the width ofthe driveway between the back of the sidewalk and
the HI Boise parking area is the same width as before the Project, again refuting claims by HI
Boise that the driveway is now too narrow as a result ofthe Project. Id.
For all of the reasons stated above, and based on the authority cited, HI Boise's claims for
taking of access should be dismissed on appeal.

VII.

SUMMARY OF GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL
OF VISIBILITY CLAIMS

HI Boise seeks damages based on loss of visibility of its property from Interstate 84. This
claim is barred as a matter of law for the following reasons.
1.

No protected property right of "visibility" or "right to be seen" by passing

motorists exists. Therefore, the construction of a public road project that diminishes visibility of
property by passing motorists does not result in a compensable taking.
2.

As the district court held in its July 23,2010 Order, Idaho law is clear that property

owners do not have a protected or compensable right to any particular flow of traffic or pattern of
traffic. Because HI Boise has no right to a particular pattern of traffic flow, it necessarily has no
right to compensation based on loss of visibility of its property by passing traffic.
3.

The law uniformly holds that where no structure allegedly impairing visibility is

constructed on land condemned from the property owner, no compensation for loss of visibility
can be recovered.
4.

Under decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, a

property owner in a condemnation case cannot recover damages for impacts caused by
construction of improvements on land not owned by the property owner.
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VIII. ARGUMENT ON VISIBILITY CLAIM
1.

Introduction.

HI Boise seeks "severance damages" for loss of visibility of its property by motorists on
Interstate 84. The alleged loss of visibility is based on construction of the new freeway overpass,
an exit ramp, and a sound wall. See R001428-001429. The overpass, exit ramp, and sound wall
were all constructed on existing public right-of-way owned by ITD. It is undisputed that none of
these structures has been constructed on property acquired from HI Boise. ROO 1971-00 1972. On
the contrary, the only improvement constructed on the property condemned from HI Boise was a
sidewalk.

2.

Because HI Boise has No Right to a Particular Pattern of Traffic Flow, it
Necessarily has No Right to Compensation Based on Loss of Visibility ofits
Property by Passing Traffic.

Idaho courts have repeatedly held that a property owner does not have a right to any
particular flow or pattern of traffic or a right to have direct access to or from a particular direction
of traffic. Brown, 124 Idaho at 42-3,855 P.2d at 879-80; Merritt, 113 Idaho at 145, 742 P.2d at

400; Bastian, 97 Idaho at 447,546 P.2d at 402; James, 88 Idaho at 178,397 P.2d at 770 (citing
Villages o/Eden & Hazelton v. Idaho Bd. o/Hwy. Dirs., 83 Idaho 554,556,367 P.2d 294,301
(1961)); Powell, 56 Idaho at 315-16,53 P.2d at 636-37.
In each of these cases, the Court held that rights of property owners abutting a street or
highway do not encompass a right to any particular access from any particular road, from any
particular direction, or a right of any particular pattern or flow of traffic. See Brown, at 41-44,
855 P.2d at 879-81 (analyzing Bastian, Merritt, and Powell).
These principles were recognized and upheld by the district court in its Order of July 23,
2010:
The right of access to a public road does not encompass a right to any particular
pattern of traffic flow. Brown v. City o/Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39, 43, 855 P.2d
876, 880 (1993). State action which results in a mere change in traffic flow that
requires traffic to reach property by a circuitous route does not amount to a taking
as a matter oflaw. !d. at 44,855 P.2d at 88l.
R001204.
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Based on these principles, lTD could re-route Interstate 84 entirely so that no traffic went
past the HI Boise property at all. Or lTD could restrict Interstate 84 so that most traffic went
elsewhere. Or, as here, ITD could divert traffic to a higher road grade (on the Vista overpass and
exit ramp). Under any of these scenarios, no taking occurs as a matter of law. The complete or
partial diversion of traffic away from HI Boise's property would also result in a complete or
partial loss of visibility of the property by that traffic. Since no compensation can be had for a
change in traffic flow or pattern, it necessarily follows that no compensation can be had for loss
of visibility.
Despite HI Boise's unsupported argument to the contrary, the issue of visibility is
necessarily and inextricably intertwined with traffic flow. See, e.g., Ivers v. Utah Dept. of
Transp., 154 P .3d 802, 806 (Utah 2007) (since a property owner has no right to flow oftraffic
past his property, "a property owner has no recognized property right to free and unrestricted
visibility of his property by passing traffic, and an impairment of that visibility does not mandate
compensation."); Dept. of Transp. v. Marilyn Hickey Ministries, 159 P.3d 111, 113 (Colo. 2007)
("We hold that because a landowner has no continued right to traffic passing by its property, the
landowner likewise has no right in the continued motorist visibility of its property"); State v.
Schmidt, 805 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App. 1991), rev'd 867 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1993) ("Just as a
landowner has no vested interest in the volume or route of passersby, he has no right to insist that
his premises be visible to them."); State ex. rei. Missouri Hwy. & Transp. Com 'n v. Dooley, 738
S.W.2d 457,468-69 (Mo. App. 1987) (in partial taking case, "any claim as to damages for 'public
view' or visibility is 'inextricably related' to a property right in the traffic, [and] the decisions
have consistently refused to 'accord to property owners any right in the continuation of traffic. "').
In short, because HI Boise has no right to a particular pattern of traffic flow, it necessarily
has no right to compensation based on loss of visibility of its property by passing traffic.
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3.

States Have Uniformly Denied Claims for Loss of Visibility When the
Structures Complained of are Not Built on the Condemned Property.

Nearly all states deny all claims based on loss of visibility. All states bar all claims for
loss of visibility when the structures alleged to block visibility are not constructed on the
condemned property.
In Ivers v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007), the state condemned a
portion ofIvers' property for construction of a frontage road adjacent to U.S. Highway 89. !d. at
803. The construction was part of a larger project to widen and elevate Highway 89. Id. Ivers'
property was located at an intersection with Highway 89, and an Arby's restaurant operated on
the site. In order to reduce accidents, UDOT eliminated the intersection by elevating the
highway over the intersecting· street. Id. at 804. Ivers sought compensation for loss of visibility.
Id. at 803-04. The Utah Supreme Court rejected the claim, holding as follows:

Neither the legislature nor this court has recognized a protected property right in
visibility of one's property from the roadway. As a result, the court of appeals
concluded that Arby's was not entitled to present evidence of claimed damage to
their property caused by a loss of visibility of the property. We agree. In Utah,
landowners do not have a protected interest in the visibility of their property from
an abutting road, even if part of their land has been taken in the process.
Id. at 805 (emphasis added). The court also held that, as in Idaho, a landowner has no property

right to traffic or flow oftraffic past his premises, and any change or impairment in traffic or
traffic flow "does not entitle the owner to compensation." Id. at 806. Based on that principle,
the court held: "[s]imilarly, a property owner has no recognized property right to free and
unrestricted visibility of his property by passing traffic, and an impairment of that visibility does
not mandate compensation." Id. The court based its ruling, in part, on the "speculative nature of
the damages sought in a claim for loss ofvisibility[.]" Id. See also Dept. of Transp. v. Admiral
Beverage Corp., 198 P.3d 1003, 1004, n.2 (Utah ct. App. 2008) ("Insofar as Admiral still seeks

to admit evidence addressing the reduced visibility of its property to motorists traveling the
nearby highways, its argument is definitively foreclosed by Ivers."); Intermountain Sports, Inc. v.
Utah Dept. ofTransp., 103 P.3d 716, 719 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) ("we are unwilling to adopt the

view that a business has a protectable property interest in the mere hope of future sales from
passing traffic or that the rerouting of traffic constitutes a compensable taking").
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In Dept. of Transp. v. Marilyn Hickey Ministries, 159 P.3d III (Colo. 2007), the Colorado
Department of Transportation constructed a light rail line as part of a project to expand and
improve Interstate 25 in the metropolitan Denver area. Id. at 112. As part of the construction of
the light rail line, CDOT filed a condemnation action to take a narrow strip of land, 650 long,
from Marilyn Hickey Ministries. Id. The property was located next to a major interchange on
1-25, at Orchard Road. Id. CDOT constructed a concrete retaining wall on the condemned
property to support an overpass for Orchard Road. Id. The property owner claimed that the
retaining wall blocked the view of the property by passing motorists on 1-25, and sought
$1.9 million for the loss of visibility alone. Id. The trial court granted CDOT's motion in limine
to exclude testimony on' loss of visibility. !d. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed that
ruling. Id. at 113. The case then went to the Supreme Court of Colorado:
We granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in ruling that
the landowner, part of whose property is being taken by eminent domain for a state
transportation project, may recover damages for the impairment of passing
motorists' view of the remainder of the landowner's property. We reverse the
court ofappeals and hold that motorists' visibility ofproperty is not a
compensable right under the Colorado Constitution.

Id. at 112 (emphasis added). In reversing the court of appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court held
as follows:
Generally, freeway visibility is analyzed as an access claim and condemnees have
been found to have no right to visibility ... We hold that because a landowner has
no continued right to traffic passing its property, the landowner likewise has no
right in the continued motorist visibility of its property from a transit corridor.

Id. at 113 (citations omitted). The court cited one of its earlier decisions, Troiano v. Colo. Dept.
ofHwys., 463 Pold 448, 455 (Colo. 1969), where it concluded that '" [w]ith the majority view
holding that a property owner has no right to have the traveling public pass his property, logically
it would be inconsistent to say that a property owner has a right to have the traveling public
afforded a clear view of his property.'" Marilyn Hickey Ministries, 159 P.3d at 144 (quoting

Troiano, 463 Pold at 455). This is precisely in accord with Idaho law and the district court's
ruling in the HI Boise case.
The Supreme Court of Colorado further held:
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[A] public transit corridor like 1-25 is an always evolving multi-modal point of
access to a city's transportation infrastructure. The state's police power enables
continued modifications to its public transportation systems and the "[rlight of
access is subject to reasonable control and limitation," Troiano, 463 P .2d at 451,
456. "[L]ogically it would be inconsistent" to recognize a right to visibility but no
right to have the traveling public pass one's property. !d. at 455. Under Troiano,
there is simply no inherent property right to continued traffic or visibility along the
1-25 transit corridor.
Marilyn Hickey Ministries, 159 P.3d at 114-15. The retaining wall in Marilyn Hickey Ministries

was located on the property condemned from the property owner, and the visibility claim was still
denied. By comparison, no structures alleged to impair visibility have been constructed on the
property condemned from HI Boise.
As additional rationale for the rule, the Colorado Supreme Court explained:
[W]hile the original construction of 1-25 may have provided a benefit of motorist
visibility looking toward the [landowner's] property, this benefit was constructed
with taxpayer funding as part of a major public works project. A motorist's view
of the [landowner's property] was an artificially created condition, established in
an exercise of the state's police power, which does not inhere in the compensable
value of the [landowner's] property. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. noted long ago
that "when a benefit is conferred upon a landowner, the value of which he does not
pay for, he takes it upon the implied condition that he shall not be paid for it when
it is taken away." Stanwood v. Malden, 157 Mass. 17, 18, 31 N.E. 702, 703
(1892).

Id. at 116. In this case, the Holiday Inn owned by HI Boise was purposefully located adjacent to
the freeway and the Vista Avenue Interchange, all constructed with taxpayer funds. The benefits
HI Boise has enjoyed for several decades by being close to this public transportation facility were
created at taxpayer expense. HI Boise cannot now claim that it should be compensated when
changes are made to the freeway and interchange, again at taxpayer expense, and on lands owned
entirely by the public and not on land condemned from HI Boise.
In City of Wichita v. McDonald's Corp., 971 P.2d 1189 (Kan. 1999), the city
reconstructed U.S. Highway 54 (also known as Kellogg Street) through the City of Wichita. Jd. at
1192. Wal-Mart owned and operated a Sam's Club at the comer of Kellogg and Dugan Streets.
Jd. As part of the project, the city condemned two strips ofland along two edges of the Sam's

Club property. Jd. at 1193. The construction project closed the intersection of Dugan and
Kellogg, causing KellogglU.S. Highway 54 to "fly-over" Dugan Street, with the grade of the
reconstructed highway rising by 21 feet above the previous grade. !d. In addition, the frontage
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roads alongside the highway were converted to one-way roads, one of which provided primary
access to Sam's Club. Id. IfITD had taken similar action in this case, it would have closed the
Vista Avenue and 1-84 Interchange entirely, and made Vista a one-way road.
The court in City a/Wichita detailed the tortuous route that motorists had to take after the
project to reach Sam's Club. !d. at 1192-93. The court also set forth the facts showing that the
visibility of Sam's Club and its signs was now blocked from both directions on the freeway and
from the on and off ramps at the nearest interchanges from Dugan Street. Visibility from the
freeway was blocked both by the substantial elevation in the grade of the freeway and by the
concrete structures supporting the freeway "fly-over" Dugan Street. Id.
Wal·Mart argued that it was entitled to compensation for loss of access, restricted access,
and loss of visibility. Id. at 1193. Finding that the Sam's Club property had "reasonable" access
after the project, the trial court excluded expert testimony offered by Wal-Mart on these claims,
on the grounds that "it takes into account, and is based on, access, view, convenience, and/or
productivity [which] bear no relation to the valuation of the taking and is not admissible." Id. at
1194. When it received a compensation award far less than that advocated by its excluded
experts, Wal-Mart appealed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas first distinguished between a "right of access"
and "regulation of traffic flow." Specifically, the court explained that a "right of access" is
"traditionally defined as an abutting landowner's common-law right of access from the
landowner's property to abutting public roads." Id. at 1197. Whereas '''[rJegulation oftraffic
flow'" or 'circuity of access' ... is an entirely separate concept. An abutting property owner has
no right to the continuation of traffic flow from nearby highways to the owner's property." Id.
Although certain of the accesses to Sam's Club were now on a one-way street that had previously
been a two-way street, and the one-way street no longer connected to the freeway near Sam's
Club, both the trial court and the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that no access had been taken as a
matter oflaw, since the property still had "reasonable" access. Id. at 1198.
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The court then addressed the following question: "Did the district court err by ruling
Wal-Mart's expert witnesses could not consider impainnent of access and view, inconvenience,
change of grade, and interference with the productive use of the subject property in assessing
damages under K.S.A. 26-513(d)?" The court flatly concluded "No." Id. at 1192. As to the
specific issue of "loss of visibility," the Supreme Court of Kansas held:
Wal-Mart also claims damages for loss of view, essentially arguing that because
Kellogg is now a raised freeway, motorists cannot see Sam's from certain vantage
points. Wal-Mart's claim finds no support as a common-law easement of view.
The easement of view or "ancient lights" doctrine protected landowners from
neighbors who would erect structures blocking light or air from the landowner.
Kansas has never adopted the doctrine. See Anderson v. Bloomheart, 101 Kan.
691,692, 168 P. 900 (1917). Wal-Mart's claim also finds no support as a "right to
be seen." A "right to be seen" claim for damages (for example the advertising
. value of a location) is generally denied. See 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain
§ 14A.03[4] (3d ed. rev. 1998).

City o/Wichita, 971 P.3d at 1198. The City o/Wichita case is squarely on point, and the
circumstances faced by Wal-Mart were far more severe than those faced by HI Boise. The Vista
Avenue Interchange is staying in place; no 1-84 "fly over" is being constructed over Vista
A venue; and freeway access to Vista is not being closed. On the contrary, the Interchange is
being upgraded and improved to operate more safely and efficiently. The freeway is not being
elevated by more than 20 feet above its existing grade as in City o/Wichita. Nor is Vista being
turned into a one-way street as in that case. As in City 0/ Wichita, the district court in this case
ruled that no access has been taken, and that HI Boise continues to have reasonable access after
the Project. Accordingly, dismissal of HI Boise's claim for "loss of view" or "diminished view"
should be affirmed.
In State v. Schmidt, 805 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), the court held that the landowner
whose property was partially condemned could put on evidence of circuity of travel, diversion of
traffic, loss of visibility, and construction interference. The court held that these elements were
compensable in detennining severance damages, i.e., the diminution in the market value of the
remainder after the condemnation. Id. at 29,35. The Texas Supreme Court interceded and
specifically reversed the court of appeals and affinned the decision of the trial court excluding the
evidence, holding that these elements or items could not be offered or considered in detennining
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severance damages. State v. Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex. 1993). The Supreme Court
of Texas ruled that these alleged damages did not result from the taking of the condemnee's
property, but rather from the state's new use of its right-of-way, id. at 777, which is precisely the
case here. The court held that the "effect" of the state's condemnation on the remainder of the
landowner's property is the taking ofa small strip of property, not the consequences of the state's
reconstruction of a highway. Id. The court further held that "diversion of traffic, inconvenience
of access, impaired visibility of ground-level buildings, and disruption of construction activities
... are, by their nature, a consequence of the change in Highway 183 shared by the entire area
through which it runs." Id. at 781.
Texas courts have continued to follow these well established principles. See State v.
Munday Enterprises, 868 S.W.2d 319, 320-21 (Tex. 1994) (no compensation is allowed for
diversion of traffic, increased circuity of travel, or lessened visibility); State v. Priesmeyer, 867
S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("Priesmeyer is not entitled to recover for damages relating
to visibility loss, diversion of traffic, circuity of travel and construction inconvenience to his
remainder property.").
Other cases are in accord. See State, Dept. of Transp. v. Suit City ofAventura, 774 So. 2d
9, 13-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (owners of shopping center complained that increased
elevation of roadway following partial taking would impair visibility of the shopping center; court
held that Florida law does not allow compensation for loss of visibility); State ex. reI. Missouri
Hwy. & Transp. Com 'n v. Dooley, 738 S.W.2d 457, 468-69 (Mo. App. 1987) (in partial taking
case, "any claim as to damages for 'public view' or visibility is 'inextricably related' to a property
right in the traffic, [and] the decisions have consistently refused to 'accord to property owners any
right in the continuation of traffic."'); Grossman Investments v. State by Humphrey, 571 N.W.2d
47,50-52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (state closed landowner's direct access to interstate highway,
reconstructed highway blocked visibility of property, and increase in height or grade of highway
blocked visibility; court held that no taking of access occurred where property continued to have
reasonable access, albeit substantially less convenient; court further held that "[t]his court has
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never recognized a right to be seen from an abutting highway, and we decline to create such a
right in this case. Accordingly, appellants are not entitled to compensation for their loss of
view"); 224 Troup Realty, Inc. v. State, 88 A.D.2d 773, 744,451 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511
(N.Y.App.Div. 1982) (in case involving partial taking by condemnation, court held that "loss
of visibility ofthe property to passing motorists" cannot be used as a basis for damages).
These rules are not new. They are long-standing and well-established. For example, in

State Hwy. Com'n v. Lavasek, 385 P.2d 361 (New Mexico 1963), the Supreme Court of New
Mexico held:
An easement ofthe right of view in an abutting property owner would create a
burden on the servient tenement, the highway. An abutter's rights in a highway are
subordinate to the paramount right of the public in the highway and of the public
authority to so construct a highway as to serve the best use by the pUblic. The state
may construct a highway in any manner not inconsistent with or prejudicial to its
use for highway purposes and the mere disturbance of the visibility of an abutter's
property from the highway by such construction or reconstruction does not give
rise to a compensable damage in the abutter.

Id. at 364. (internal citation omitted). See also In re Appropriation ofEasement for Highway
Purposes (Preston v. Weiler), 194 N.E.2d 440,444-46 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962) (interference with
visibility of owners' land due to change in street grade did not constitute a taking and did not
warrant compensation) (rev'd on other grounds 191 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio 1963); National Biscuit

Co. v. New York, 211 N.Y.S.2d 435,436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) (compensation award improperly
included compensation for loss of visibility of business by users of abutting street, and
condemnee's experts improperly testified as to loss of visibility from roadway).
In this case, HI Boise is trying to recover damages that result, not from the effect that the
taking of a narrow strip of its land for the construction of a sidewalk has on the remainder of its
property, but for distant changes in the grade of the freeway and the height of a new overpass
constructed on existing public right-of-way owned by ITD. The claim ofloss of visibility is
contrary to Idaho case law and case law from across the country. Therefore, the decision
dismissing HI Boise's claim for loss of visibility should be affinned.

lTD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 49

4.

No Split in Authority Exists When None of the Structures Blocking Visibility
are Built on the Condemned Land.

HI Boise alleges that there is a split in authority on the issue of whether loss of visibility is
compensable in condemnation cases. In fact, nearly all courts bar all claims for loss of visibility,
and all courts uniformly bar all claims for loss of visibility when the structure alleged to block
visibility is not located on the property condemned from the property owner - which is the case
here.
According to NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, courts have uniformly rejected claims for
loss of visibility where the components of a public project that block visibility are constructed on
property other than the condemnee's property. 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 13.21[1]
(rev.3d ed. 1998). In other words, if the structure is erected on the property owner's land
condemned for the project (causing the issue to be addressed as severance damages), a few courts
have allowed the landowner to recover compensation. Conversely, where the structure blocking
visibility is built on other land, not the condemnee's property, compensation has been uniformly
denied.
5.

None of the Cases Cited by HI Boise Support its Claim.

In support of its contention that a "split in authority" exists, HI Boise cites the following
cases: State v. Weiswasser, 693 A.2d 864 (N.J. 1997); Ivers v. Utah Dept. o/Transp., 154 P.3d
802 (Utah 2007); Klaber v. Lakenan, 64 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1933); People v. Wasserman, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); County o/Bexar v. Santikos, 144 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. 2004); and

State v. McCarley, 247 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007). None of these cases support HI Boise's
claim.
HI Boise first cites State v. Weiswasser, in which the state condemned a small part of a
large tract of undeveloped property fronting a major highway. 693 A.2d at 865. As a result of the
partial taking, the property owners lost "the widest stretch of contiguous highway frontage." Id.
The property owners sought to present evidence ofloss of visibility of the remaining property as a
result of the reduced highway frontage. Id. HI Boise claims that Weiswasser supports its
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contention that there is a split in authority on the issue of whether loss of visibility is
compensable. Here is what the court said on the issue of an alleged split in authority:
Loss of visibility as an element of severance damages may be related to a loss of
access and the basis for the compensability for such damages would be whether the
loss is attributable to the taking of the property itself or off-site conditions. In
State v. Stulman, 136 N.J. Super. 148,345 A.2d 329 (App. Div. 1975), the court
specifically considered a damages claim based on the loss of visibility. The court
rejected the owner's argument that he was entitled to compensation for the loss of
visibility of his property because the loss resulted, not from the partial taking in
the case, but from the construction of a new highway on property belonging to
others. Id. at 162,345 A.2d 329.
Other courts are split on whether loss of visibility is compensable in a partialtaking action ... Most courts have not recognized a property interest in
maintaining the visibility of one's property:
Generally, this right is denied, principally upon the theory that one has no
control over his neighbor's property and therefore could not prevent his
neighbor, under most principles of real property law, from erecting barriers
to prevent his right to be seen. Therefore a taking by a public authority
takes nothing from him.
4A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 14A.03[4] (Sackman & Van Brunt eds., 3d
ed. rev. 1997).
Weiswasser, 693 A.2d at 874-75 (emphasis added). Thus, according to the Supreme Court of
New Jersey: (i) New Jersey courts are not split on the issue; (ii) most courts outside of New
Jersey have not recognized a property interest in visibility; (iii) based on NICHOLS, the right of
visibility is generally denied; and (iv) no recovery is allowed for loss of visibility where the
obstruction is not built on property condemned from the landowner, but is "off-site" or on
"property belonging to others." In the case at hand, it is undisputed that none ofthe alleged
obstructions to visibility have been constructed on the land condemned from HI Boise. Rather, all
obstructions have been built on existing lTD right-of-way. The land condemned from HI Boise
was used to build a sidewalk, which does not block visibility of the HI Boise property.
The court in Weiswasser went on to cite additional cases for the following propositions:
State v. Schmidt, 805 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd 867 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1993)
(holding that owners were not entitled to compensation for diminution of value of the remainder
due to lessened visibility, increased circuity of travel, or diversion of traffic, and stating that
"[j]ust as a landowner has no vested interest in the volume or route of passersby, he has no right
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to insist that his premises be visible to them."); Acme Theatres, Inc. v. New York, 310 N.Y.S.2d
496, 500, 258 N.E.2d 912, 914-15 (1970) ("Our courts have consistently refused to award
consequential damages because the owner's property is no longer visible to passing
motorists .... "). Weiswasser, 693 A.2d at 875.
The court in Weiswasser also discussed at length the difference in the law between loss of
visibility due to obstructions built on the landowner's property taken in the condemnation case
versus obstructions built "off-site" or on lands "other than" the landowner's condemned property.
In particular, the court discussed with favor 8,960 Square Feet v. Alaska, 806 P.2d 843 (Alaska
1991), as follows:
In that case, the state sought to condemn a portion of a parcel of property in
conjunction with altering and improving the abutting road. Two aspects of the
project diminished the visibility of the remaining property: (1) the project entailed
the construction of a railroad overpass, which would require the creation of a
gradually rising earthen berm constructed totally on property owned by the
railroad, and (2) the abutting road would be lowered between five and seven feet
from its original level and part ofthe newly expanded and lowered road would be
constructed on the land taken from the owner.
The court rejected the claim for lost visibility attributable to the construction of
the earthen berm. Id. at 845-46. The court ruled that because the owners had
no easement over the property owned by the railroad, and because the earthen
berm was to be constructed solely on the railroad's property, loss of visibility
attributable to the berm was not compensable. The court held, however, that the
landowner could recover for loss of visibility as a result of the widening and
lowering of the abutting road because those changes, unlike the construction of the
earthen behn, involved property of the owner that was taken.

* * *
The Alaska supreme court made a distinction between visibility lost as a result of
changes occurring off the taken land and visibility lost as a result of changes
occurring on the taken land.

Weiswasser, 693 A.2d at 875 (emphasis added). Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
the "[t]he critical factor, therefore, in determining ifloss of visibility is a compensable element of
damages in a partial-taking condemnation, is whether the loss arises from changes occurring on
the property taken." Id. at 876.
Contrary to supporting HI Boise's claim for loss of visibility, all of the analysis and
holdings in Weiswasser support dismissal of the claim. The court found that most courts have
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refused to recognize a claim for loss of visibility and that such claims are generally denied. It
held in particular that where, as here, the obstructions causing the alleged loss of visibility are not
built on land condemned from the property owner, then no protected right has been taken and no
compensation is owed.
HI Boise next cites Ivers v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007). As noted
above, Ivers held that Utah does not recognize a right of "visibility" and claims for alleged loss of
visibility are not compensable in Utah. Id. at 805 ("In Utah, landowners do not have a protected
interest in the visibility oftheir property from an abutting road, even ifpart of their land has been
taken in the process."). Thus, Ivers offers no support for HI Boise's claim. On the contrary, the
Supreme Court of Utah would have dismissed the claim.
HI Boise cites dicta in Ivers for the proposition that there is a split in authority on whether
loss of visibility is compensable. In Ivers, the Utah Supreme Court noted as follows:
While some states recognize an easement of visibility where an obstruction is built
on the condemned land, other states have concluded that visibility, by itself, is
simply not a compensable property right.

Id. at 805 (citations omitted). Thus, the split in authority noted by the Utah Supreme Court is
between states that deny compensation for loss of visibility in all circumstances and a few states
that allow compensation for loss of visibility when the obstruction is built on the condemned land.
Here, none of the obstructions complained of by HI Boise (the overpass, sound wall, and exit
ramp) are on the land condemned from HI Boise along the border of Vista Avenue. All courts
deny this claim.
HI Boise next cites Klaber v. Lakenan, 64 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1933). Klaber involved a suit
by one business owner against another to remove obstructions blocking the view of the plaintiffs
business. Id. at 88. The case does not address or support a claim for loss of visibility in a
condemnation case. Moreover, the court in Klaber affirmed the trial court's denial of the request
that the obstructions be removed. Id. at 91 (also finding that "opinion testimony on this matter
was oflittle value").
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HI Boise next cites People v. Wasserman, 50 Ca1.Rptr. 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966). In

Wasserman, the state condemned a portion ofWassennan's property as part of a large highway
project. Id. at 97. A wholesale grocery business operated on the property, involving frequent
heavy truck traffic in and out of the property. Id. at 98. The property was bounded by large
public roads that were through streets in both directions from the property. Id. The state project
involved construction of a freeway which cut across the streets bounding the subject property.
Following construction of the project, the streets abutting the property were pennanently closed
south of the property, "thus abolishing direct access from defendants' property to any point north"
including the central business district of the nearby city. Id. The condemned property was not
used for construction of the freeway proper, but was used to widen an adjoining street and
intersection. Id.
The property owner sought to introduce evidence ofloss of access and loss of parking and
maneuvering area for the large trucks and trailers entering and exiting the property. Id. The trial
court excluded all evidence regarding the alleged impainnent of access. Id. at 99. The trial court
based its ruling on case law holding that damages are not recoverable when they result from
construction of improvements located on the lands of others. Id. Since the impaired access
resulted from construction ofthe freeway, which was not constructed on Wassennan's land, the
alleged impainnent was not compensable. Id. The California Court of Appeals affinned the
exclusion of the offered testimony and the denial of compensation for impaired access. Id. at 101.
The landowner in Wasserman also sought to recover compensation for "loss of view" of
the business from nearby roads. Id. at 105. The trial court held that Wassennan had no right to
recover for loss of view, and the court of appeals affinned. Id. The court of appeals affinned
on two grounds. First, Wassennan could not recover for alleged loss of visibility "since the
improvement causing the loss of view, the freeway itself, was not located on property taken
from these defendants." Id. This is precisely the situation in the case at hand, where the
improvements causing the loss of view complained of by HI Boise are not located on the land
condemned from HI Boise.
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Second, the court held that since the adjoining streets were no longer through streets, and
there was no longer any traffic to Wasserman's property from the north, there was no impairment
of visibility by that traffic and the alleged loss of visibility was not compensable. Id. at 106.
This reflects the analysis followed by many courts - that the issue of visibility is inextricably
tied to the flow of traffic. Since there is no right to the flow of traffic by one's property, no
compensation can be had for loss of visibility when that traffic is diverted away from the
property. In short, Wasserman provides no support for HI Boise's visibility claim and in fact bars
the claim.
HI Boise next cites County ofBexar v. Santikos, 144 S. W.3d 455 (Tex. 2004), for the
proposition that "if the land taken is an indispensable and substantial part of the general project,"
damages caused by construction on adjoining land can be recovered. Id. at 463. In that case,
the Supreme Court of Texas found that, although the land taken would be used to help raise a
frontage road, only the embankment for the raised road would be on the condemned property and
the road itself would not. Id. at 462-63. Therefore, the court ruled that the alleged damages
arising from the raised frontage road were not compensable. Id. at 463. Even though the
condemned land was used in raising the frontage road, it was not deemed to be "an indispensable
and substantial part." Id. In the case at hand, the only thing built on the land acquired from HI
Boise is a sidewalk. Particularly when compared to the facts and holding in Santikos, the land
acquired from HI Boise is not an "indispensable and substantial part" ofthe new interchange over
Interstate 84, the exit ramp, or the sound wall, all of which have been constructed entirely on

existing public property. R001971-001972.
Santikos offers no support for HI Boise's claim. Like Idaho cases such as Fonburg,
Bastian, and Brown, the Texas Supreme Court made clear that "not all damages to remainder
property are compensable." Id. at 459. The court also held that the landowner's claim for
restricted and unsafe access was barred because "reasonable access" to the remaining land was
still available. Id. at 460. Because Texas courts had already rejected claims based on "loss of
visibility,: the Texas Supreme Court noted that "counsel for Santikos repeatedly denied making
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any claim that had anything to do with diminished access, diminished visibility, or circuity of
travel." Id.
The court in Santikos further held that none of the damages sought by the property owner
were recoverable because the damages were not caused by elements of the public project built on
the land condemned from the property owner. "Damages to remainder property are recoverable
only to the extent they arise from public use of the condemned land, not from public use ofland
the public already owns." Id. at 462. Here, all improvements alleged to block visibility are
located on "land the public already owns." As to the specific issue of visibility, and the claim
that the project placed the defendant's property "in a hole," the Texas Supreme Court held that
"landowners have no right to insist that their premises be visible[.]" Id. at 463.
Lastly, HI Boise cites State v. McCarley, 247 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) as support
for its claim for loss of visibility. The property owner in McCarley made no claim for loss of
visibility and the case does not address whether loss of visibility is a compensable loss.
Moreover, Texas has repeatedly ruled that loss of visibility is not compensable. See State v.
Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d 769, 770, 777-81 (Tex. 1993); State v. Munday Enterprises, 868 S.W.2d
319,320-21 (Tex. 1994); State v. Priesmeyer, 867 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); County
o/Bexar v. Santikos, 144 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. 2004).
The issue in McCarley was whether damages caused by storm water and drainage
problems claimed by the property owner resulted from the state's use of the condemned property,
or whether the damages resulted from improvements constructed on existing public right-of-way.
McCarley, 247 S.W.3d at 330. The court found that the damages did in fact result from the
state's use of the condemned land. !d. Thus, McCarley also supports dismissal of HI Boise's
claim for loss of visibility, because the improvements complained of (the Vista overpass, exit
ramp, and sound wall) were not constructed on the condemned property. All structures
complained of by HI Boise were constructed on existing public right-of-way. The only thing
constructed on HI Boise's property was a sidewalk, which does not obstruct visibility in any way.
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In summary, none of the cases cited by HI Boise support its claim for loss of visibility,
and the claim should be dismissed.
6.

Contrary To HI Boise's Argument, lTD is Not Improperly Segmenting the
Project.

As shown extensively in the cases cited above, loss of visibility claims are universally
denied when the blocking structures are not built on the condemned property. HI Boise tries to
avoid this legal doctrine by arguing that lTD is improperly segmenting the elements of the
Project. The property acquired from HI Boise was used to construct a sidewalk on Vista Avenue.
All elements of the Project that HI Boise alleges block visibility of its property have been
constructed on land that has long been public right-of-way. lTD is not segmenting the Project on
this issue. Rather, case law makes this distinction. Specifically, if the obstructions are built on
existing right-of-way or on lands "belonging to others" then claims for loss of visibility are
universally denied. In addition, Idaho law expressly bars claims for damages in condemnation
cases based on impacts from improvements built on land not condemned from the property
owner. See Sections VI.(G) and (H) above.
7.

lTD Did Not Admit that HI Boise has Suffered Loss of Visibility.

HI Boise claims that lTD admitted in the Stipulation for Possession that HI Boise will
suffer loss of visibility. HI Boise App. Brf., at 19. HI Boise misstates the terms ofthe stipulation.
In fact, the stipulation reads as follows: "Plaintiff acknowledges the significant concerns
Defendant has over the loss of visibility due to Plaintiff's development plans as currently
contemplated." Stip. for Poss., at 2 (filed June 16,2009). Acknowledging that HI Boise has
concerns about loss of visibility is not an admission that HI Boise has suffered loss of visibility or
that HI Boise has a legal right to compensation for loss of visibility.
8.

HI Boise Mischaracterizes the Visibility of the Property After the Project.

HI Boise claims that its property will be "in a hole" after the project. This characterization
is refuted by the fact that the property is located at the crest of the Boise rim. The property also
has direct, street-level frontage on Vista Avenue and Sunrise Rim Roads both before and after the
Project.
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9.

Idaho Code § 7-711(2)(b) Does Not Permit Recovery of Damages Based on
Project Improvements Built Beyond or Outside the Condemned Property.

HI Boise tries to avoid the rule barring recovery for loss of visibility where the
obstructions are not built on the condemned property by citing Idaho Code § 7-711(2)(b).
HI Boise contends that the statute allows recovery of all forms of damages. Again, this argument
is refuted by the many Idaho Supreme Court cases which have held that various forms of damages
are not compensable. No authority exists for the proposition that § 7-711(2)(b) allows recovery
of damages barred by Idaho law.
The State of Florida was one of the first states to adopt a statute authorizing recovery of
business damages in condemnation cases involving partial takings. Idaho's business damage
statute is modeled on Florida's business damage statute. See Idaho Code § 7-711(2)(b). In State
Road Dept. v. Lewis, 170 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1964), the Supreme Court of Florida, in addressing the
Florida business damage statute and a claim for loss of visibility in a partial taking case, held as
follows:
The statute, § 73.10, does not, in our view, change or enlarge the judicial rule
against allowing consequential damage because of change of grade of an
authorized roadway affecting access, light or view. It only operates in the
condemnation of a right of way where the effect of the taking of the property itself
may damage or destroy an established business of more than five years standing, in
which event the jury shall only consider what effect the denial ofthe use of the
specific property taken has upon the said business and award special damages.
These special business damages authorized by the statute are predicated upon the
effect the taking ofan owner's land for a right of way has upon such a business
and not upon the effoct the construction ofan overpass or other change ofgrade of
a roadway has upon such business. The District Court of Appeal while basing its
nevertheless deviated from the
determination upon its interpretation of § 73.1
long adhered to holdings of this court that consequential damages arising from the
elevation or change of grade of an authorized road by the construction of an
overpass or otherwise are not the subject of compensation.

°...

Id. at 819 (emphasis added). No Florida courts since have allowed claims for loss of visibility

under the business damage statute. Likewise, nothing in Idaho's business damage statute permits
recovery for damages barred by law or damages not caused by the taking of HI Boise's property.
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10.

HI Boise Cannot Establish a Taking or Recover Compensation for Loss of
Visibility Caused by Construction on Property Not Condemned from
HI Boise.

Idaho has long followed the rule of eminent domain law that if alleged damages originate
from land not taken from the property owner in a condemnation case then, as a matter oflaw, the
landowner is not entitled to damages. See Section VI.(G) and (H) above, and the constitutional
provisions, statutes, and case law cited therein.
For all of the reasons stated above, and based on the authority cited, the dismissal of
HI Boise's claim for damages based on an alleged "loss of visibility" should be affirmed on
appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of September, 2011.
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